# 1nc

# 1

**Obama is aggressively pushing completion of a farm bill --- it’s his top priority**

**Dreiling, 11/15/13** (Larry, 11/15/2013, “Branches jockey for farm bill positions,” <http://www.hpj.com/archives/2013/nov13/nov18/1112FarmBillLDsr.cfm)>)

While the House-Senate farm bill discussions continue, the White House staked out its position in an address in New Orleans. Senate Agriculture Committee Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow signaled Nov. 5 that face-to-face talks among the top four farm bill negotiators will resume this week, and she is upbeat enough to hope for a deal by Thanksgiving. “I hope so. It’s doable,” the Michigan Democrat said to the Capitol Hill publication Politico. “I feel confident the four of us can come together,” Stabenow said, speaking of herself, Sen. Thad Cochran, R-MS; Rep. Collin Peterson, D-MN; and House Agriculture Committee Chairman Frank Lucas, R-OK. While the House remained on recess through Veterans Day, Peterson’s office confirmed that he was flying back to Washington early in the week, and Stabenow told Politico that all four would meet. “The savings of the farm bill will certainly be part of the solution to the budget,” said Stabenow, who is also part of those House-Senate negotiations. But she and Lucas have both said repeatedly that the text of any farm bill will be theirs to write. “The issue is who writes the farm bill,” Stabenow said. “We’ll write the farm bill.” For all her optimism, the chairwoman gave little ground herself on the contentious issue of savings on nutrition programs. The Senate farm bill proposes about $4 billion in 10-year savings, compared with the $39 billion in reductions assumed in the revised nutrition title approved by the House in September. It’s a huge gap, but Stabenow insisted that negotiators can’t ignore previously enacted food stamp cuts that went into effect Nov. 1. Those reductions will reduce spending by as much as $11 billion over the period used by the Congressional Budget Office to score the farm bill. Typically, these are not counted since the savings result from prior actions by Congress. But Stabenow said they cannot be ignored. “I am counting them,” she told Politco. “That’s real and if (the House’s) objective is to cut help for people, that started last Friday. I do count that. In fairness, that needs to be counted.” In the same vein, she showed no interest in a compromise narrowing the range of income and asset tests now used by states in judging eligibility for food stamps. “At this point, what I’m interested in doing is focusing on fraud and abuse—ways to tighten up the system to make it more accountable,” she said. “I’m not interested in taking food away from folks who have had an economic disaster, just as I’m not interested in cutting crop insurance for farmers who have had economic disasters.” Meanwhile, President Barack Obama delivered a speech at the Port of New Orleans Nov. 8, saying that passing a farm bill is the No. 1 way that Democrats and Republicans can increase jobs in the economy. Helping American businesses grow, creating more jobs—these are not Democratic or Republican priorities, Obama said. “They are priorities that everybody, regardless of party, should be able to get behind. And that’s why, in addition to working with Congress to grow our exports, I’ve put forward additional ideas where I believe Democrats and Republicans can join together to make progress right now,” Obama said. That’s when Obama **launched into his pitch on the farm bill**. “Congress needs to pass a farm bill that helps rural communities grow and protects vulnerable Americans,” Obama said. “For decades, Congress found a way to compromise and pass farm bills without fuss. For some reason, now Congress can’t even get that done. “Now, this is not something that just benefits farmers. Ports like this one depend on all the products coming down the Mississippi. So let’s do the right thing, pass a farm bill. We can start selling more products. That’s more business for this port. And that means more jobs right here.” Obama listed immigration reform and a responsible budget as his second and third priorities.

**An agreement is almost complete**

**Rogers, 12/4/13** (David, “Big trades advance farm bill talks” Politico, <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/farm-bill-talks-progress-100670.html>)

Farm bill negotiators **broke major new ground** toward a long-sought deal, even as a leading agriculture lobby urged rival commodity groups Wednesday to “close ranks” behind a final package this winter.¶ Staff were closeted still working out the details and much will depend on final scoring from the Congressional Budget Office. But both sides made important concessions in the course of an hourlong closed-door meeting Wednesday of the four top principals from the House and Senate Agriculture committees.¶ The House moved off its position that all commodity subsidies be a function of a farmer’s planted acres. The Senate agreed to greater food stamp savings — albeit still far short of the $40 billion in 10 years cuts approved by the House in September.¶ “We’re making great progress, across the board we’re trying to bring it all together,” Senate Agriculture Committee Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.) told reporters. “We are coming closer in every part of the bill.”¶ Her counterpart, House Agriculture Committee Chairman Frank Lucas (R-Okla.) was cautious but decidedly more upbeat than he had been 24 hours before. “We made great progress. We have more progress to make,” Lucas said. “Let us keep working.”¶ Neither Lucas nor Stabenow discussed any details, but the format of Wednesday’s meeting gave Stabenow the opportunity to present what was described as a five-page response to proposals previously made by Lucas. The fact that both chairs came out smiling was a healthy sign, and after weeks of floundering there was genuine hope that the pieces of a deal could be coming together.¶ Indeed, the framework for the commodity title appeared to be largely in place if the compromise holds regarding base vs. planted acres. In the case of the nutrition title, the Senate moved off what had been a rigid position of rejecting any savings beyond the $4 billion in its bill.

**SNAP is the last item in negotiations and Obama’s capital is key to brokering the deal**

**Hagstrom, 11/3/13** --- founder and executive editor of The Hagstrom Report (11/3/2013, Jerry, “Compromise Is the Key to a New Farm Bill; It is time for House and Senate conferees to stop listening to the lobbyists and finish the bill,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/outside-influences/compromise-is-the-key-to-a-new-farm-bill-20131103>))

It was a good question because the bill's overlong development period has given all the interests so many opportunities to state their positions that they seem more dug in than in past bill-writing efforts. But at the conference last week there were signals that the conferees think the time to act has come. The 41 conferees did use the last and possibly only public opportunity to make the case for their views. But almost all the members abided by the directive from the conference leader, House Agriculture Committee Chairman Frank Lucas, R-Okla., to keep their remarks to three minutes. And even the most ideological of them on the right and left were polite and stressed that they were there to compromise and finish a bill. It's unclear how quickly the conferees will proceed to the big issues because the House has left town until Nov. 12, the day after Veterans Day. There has been talk of a meeting on the bill between President Obama and the four conference committee principals—Lucas, House Agriculture ranking member Collin Peterson, D-Minn., Senate Agriculture Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow, D-Mich., and Senate Agriculture ranking member Thad Cochran, R-Miss. Peterson said he has mixed feelings about such a meeting because support from Obama might cause some House members to oppose the bill. But Peterson noted that the "one place" on which Obama could be "helpful" would be resolving the size of the cut to food stamps, formally known as the **S**upplemental **N**utrition **A**ssistance **P**rogram. Lucas has said that it is likely to be the last item settled and that Obama, House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., will have to make the call on that. The official White House position on food stamps is to make no cuts, while the Senate-passed farm bill would cut the program by $4 billion over 10 years and the House-passed bill would cut it by $39 billion over the same period.

**New Latin American economic engagement initiatives cause a massive loss in political capital**

**Isacson, 11**

Adam, Senior Associate @ WOLA, Washington Office on Latin America, Areas of Expertise: Regional and Military Security Policy, Arms Transfers, Civil-Military Relations, Colombia, International Drug Policy, Mexico, Peace Processes, U.S. Assistance, Adam Isacson is a key member of WOLA’s Regional Security Policy team. He is a leading expert on defense, civil-military relations, and U.S. security assistance to the Americas. He collaborates on Just the Facts—a constantly updated source of information and analysis of the United States’ often troubled relationship with Latin America’s militaries. He helped found Just the Facts in the early 1990s. Mr. Isacson has co-authored dozens of publications, including “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy” and “Waiting for Change,” which examine the increasing role of the military in U.S. foreign policy. During the 2000s, Mr. Isacson focused on Colombia, the principal destination of U.S. aid to Latin America at the time. At the end of the decade, he published “Don’t Call It a Model,” a comprehensive look at the lessons to be learned from Plan Colombia. He has testified before Congress on international drug policy, Colombia’s conflict, U.S. military aid programs and human rights, and has organized several congressional delegations to the region. He is “among the few in Washington who genuinely affect how policy-makers in Congress and the administration shape their decisions and policy proposals,” says a congressional staffer who closely follows Latin America policy. He is known for his pithy commentary, shared online daily through regular contributions to Just the Facts and other blogs. Among Latin America analysts, he has been a leader in cutting-edge use of technology for transparency, instant analysis, and advocacy. Mr. Isacson joined WOLA in 2010 after fourteen years working on Latin American and Caribbean security issues with the Center for International Policy (CIP). Before WOLA and CIP, he worked for the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress in San José, Costa Rica as a program assistant for demilitarization. 3/10, http://www.wola.org/commentary/president\_obama\_s\_upcoming\_trip\_to\_latin\_america

Though Latin Americans’ perceptions of the United States have improved since a low point during the Bush administration, our country is no longer the central player in the economic lives of most Latin American countries, either through trade or aid. As a result, it carries **much less political weight**. Though it is not his intention, President Obama’s trip will underscore that the era of unquestioned U.S. leadership has ended, as the President himself acknowledged at the 2009 Summit of the Americas, when he emphasized building an “equal partnership” with the region’s states. In this new reality, the White House has made an astute choice of countries to visit. Each carries great symbolic value. • In Brazil, President Obama’s discussions with President Dilma Rousseff will highlight the global power and influence of South America’s rapidly growing giant. It may also mark a notable improvement in the tone of U.S. relations with Rousseff’s government, which assumed power in January. • In both Brazil and Chile, President Obama will recognize the success of long, difficult transitions from military dictatorship to democracy. Both countries are still trying to uncover the truth about the mass human rights abuses committed before those transitions began, and to hold the worst abusers accountable. The President would do well to acknowledge these important efforts. • In El Salvador, the President will be commemorating a successful transition from all-out civil war to stable peace, with a democracy so healthy that, following its 2009 elections, it underwent a smooth transition of power to the opposition: the party of the former guerrilla insurgency. President Obama’s trip is also important for what it is not “about.” This is not a visit driven by U.S. threat perceptions. Except for where it touches discussions of public security and organized crime, drugs — and the U.S. “war” on them — are not on the agenda. Nor should we expect much discussion of terrorism, Iran or even Venezuela. The focus on opportunities instead of threats is very welcome. Not all of the messages will be positive, however. In a time of reduced power and **deep budget cuts**, President Obama will be arriving largely empty-handed. There is relatively little new economic aid to offer; much of what the Administration can propose is re-programming to meet priority needs, improved coordination, and technical assistance. These are important, but not a substitute for new assistance and new initiatives. Not only can we expect few offers of new economic aid, we can expect few commitments to **spend substantial political capital**. The administration, though supportive, is unlikely to make a **major political commitment** to help Latin America address what, according to opinion polls throughout the region, are its main concerns: public security, unemployment, weak institutions, and migration. While crime and violence will be mentioned in Brazil and El Salvador, the **most** President Obama is likely to offer is a commitment to maintain modest **existing levels of assistance** for police and judicial institution-building. On the economy and jobs, the President will visit Chile and Brazil, whose growth rates dwarf our own. In his visit to El Salvador, whose economy is only beginning to recover from the financial crisis that hit the United States, the President is likely to support targeted anti-poverty efforts, but **no major new initiatives**. Strengthening institutions requires supporting reformers both in government and civil society, including human rights defenders and leaders of unions and social movements — something on which the U.S. record is mixed. On migration — a third-rail political issue in today’s Washington — we can expect little. (El Salvador seeks a long-term resolution of the status of the two hundred thousand Salvadorans still here on a “temporary protected” basis, but no immediate solution is at hand.) We will hear words like “partnership” and “engagement” used quite heavily and repeatedly in the course of this trip. This is certainly the right tone to take. But those words have little meaning, though, if they don’t come with a commitment to **expend resources — both political and financial** — to help our “partners” address their own concerns, even if it occasionally **displeases a domestic political constituency**. True partners are also willing to admit when their policies are not working, rather than forge blindly ahead as we have done in Cuba, the drug war, our trade policy and elsewhere. Latin America no longer revolves around the U.S. “sun,” and our policy toward the region can no longer act as though it does. Let’s hope that the tone and content of the President’s visit reflect that.

**New farm bill key to prevent a doubling in food prices**

**Thuman, 12/5/13** (Scott, “Farm Bill hangs in the balance as crucial deadline looms”

Read more: http://www.wjla.com/articles/2013/12/farm-bill-hangs-in-the-balance-as-crucial-deadline-looms-97746.html#ixzz2mhOX4n2X

WASHINGTON (WJLA) - While much of the nation has been focusing on President Barack Obama's health care bill, there's another major battle taking place on Capitol Hill over pending legislation.¶ It's the Farm Bill, and it affects every single American. What more, it's in danger of expiring at year's end, and that could be **catastrophic** for the nation.¶ Very few pending bills before Congress could have such an **immediate and negative impact** on people across america, and debate over the Farm Bill has been fierce in both houses of Congress.¶ In an exclusive interview, Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack says that the mishandling of the Farm Bill could lead to **major market disruptions**; in his words, breakfast would be "much more expensive."¶ "(I) would have to go out into the marketplace and start purchasing commodities - milk, butter, cheese and grains **at highly inflated prices**," Vilsack said. "If I'm paying **twice the market price**, you can do the math."¶ The New Year's deadline that could send the price of milk skyward looms over congressional negotiators as they try to reach agreement on a five-year bill. They've been tripped up by differences over the nation's food stamp program and how to restructure farm subsidies.¶ Finding a compromise on cuts to the nation's $80 billion-a-year food stamp program has been the toughest obstacle over the last two years. The House passed a bill this summer that would cut $4 billion from food stamps - now known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP - annually and allow states to create new work requirements for some recipients.¶ The Democratic Senate, backed by President Barack Obama, passed a farm bill with $400 million annual cut, or a tenth of the House cut. There also major disputes over how farmers crops should be calculated for subsidies.

**Extinction**

**Brown 9** (Lester R, Founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute “Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Scientific American, May, <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=civilization-food-shortages>)

**The biggest threat to global stability** is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation¶ One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis.¶ For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization.¶ I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures--forces me to conclude that such **a collapse is possible.** The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever.As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, **entire nations will break down** at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk.States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy.Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

# 2

**Using its licensing authority and enforcement discretion, the United States Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control should exempt transactions involving ethanol and biofuels from enforcement under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.**

#### OFAC can issue licenses for these commodities

GT 9 — GreenbergTaurig LLP, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, September, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=15&ved=0CJABEBYwDg&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gtlaw.com%2Fportalresource%2Flookup%2Fwosid%2Fcontentpilot-core-401-13516%2FpdfCopy.name%3D%2FGTAlert_New%2520Gen%2520Lic%2520for%2520AgMed%2520Cuba%2520Travel_Sep2009.pdf%3Fview%3Dattachment&ei=-kDpUYjRMsKVygHy_YHwBA&usg=AFQjCNHhSnsOy348JVJyRrDsYGRomo5skA&sig2=rfnGEiEpIta__DgqzQufbw>, “New General License for AgMed Travel to Cuba,” ADM

On September 3, 2009, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (the “Cuba Regulations”), 31 C.F.R. Part 515 (2009), providing a General License for travel to Cuba for marketing and sales of eligible agricultural commodities and medical items. The revisions will be published in the September 8, 2009, Federal Register, but are effective as of September 3, 2009. The revisions implement provisions of the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (“Omnibus Act”) and President Obama’s April 13, 2009, initiative lessening restrictions imposed against Cuba (see previous GT Alerts, Cuba: Congress Begins To Push Open The Door; White House Continues Momentum on Relaxing Cuban Restrictions). The new General License, to be published at Section 515.533(e) of the Cuba Regulations, permits U.S. individuals, employees of U.S. companies and employees of subsidiaries of U.S. companies to travel to Cuba without prior authorization from OFAC for the marketing and sale of eligible U.S. agricultural commodities, medicine and medical devices to Cuba, under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), (also known as the “AgMed Program”).

# 3

#### A) Interpretation – “substantially” means real and at the present time

**Words and Phrases** 19**64** (40 W&P 759) (this edition of W&P is out of print; the page number no longer matches up to the current edition and I was unable to find the card in the new edition. However, this card is also available on google books, Judicial and statutory definitions of words and phrases, Volume 8, p. 7329)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; **real at present time**, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318.

#### B) Violation – “phase out” is gradual, not immediately at the present time

**American Heritage Dictionary, 9** – (“Phase Out”, Fourth Edition, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/phase+out>) EK

phase out

vb

(tr, adverb) to discontinue or withdraw **gradually**

n phase-out

the action or an instance of phasing out a phase-out of conventional forces

#### C) Voting issue—

**1. Ground** – affs that are implemented gradually don’t link to any temporal or perception-based offense like Politics – that ruins the ability to be negative.

**2. Predictability** – the aff becomes a moving target because they can change the end date of a gradual project to spike out of offense.

# 4

**The only blockade preventing Saudi Arabian proliferation is a strong US security commitment – perception of shifting oil consumption causes proliferation**

**Rogers 3/20** – [2013 – Will Rogers is the Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). At CNAS, Mr. Rogers’ research focus is on science, technology and national security policy. He has authored or co-authored a range of publications on energy, climate change, environmental cooperation in Asia and cybersecurity, “America Committed to Gulf Security Despite Changing Relationship with Region's Oil, says Gen. Dempsey,” Center for New American Security, 2013, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2013/03/america-committed-gulf-security-despite-changing-relationship-regions-]

America’s relationship with the Middle East’s energy resources is changing as U.S. domestic oil production continues to grow. A combination of hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling and advanced seismic technologies have contributed to the largest annual growth in U.S. crude oil production since Colonel Edwin Drake first drilled for oil in Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859. Most of the crude oil is coming from shale formations in North Dakota and Texas – what we call “light tight oil.” Since 2010, the United States has, on average, increased monthly crude oil production by 50,000 barrels a day. Not all of this U.S. light tight oil is displacing Middle East crude, of course. A number of factors matter, most importantly the crude oil grade. The United States is producing light tight oil, that is, **low-density crude oil**, whereas the United States imports heavier crudes from the Persian Gulf, including from **Saudi Arabia**. Moreover, U.S. refineries have been increasingly geared to absorb heavier crudes, from the Persian Gulf, but more so from Canada, Mexico and Venezuela. Nevertheless, the glut in U.S. crude oil production and declining demand for oil (a consequence of slow economic growth and more fuel efficient vehicles) have contributed to a powerful notion that the United States is relying less and less on oil from the Persian Gulf and could conceivably help wean America off crude oil imports from the Middle East entirely (a debatable point). Whether or not one believes that the United States can break the tether to Middle East oil, U.S. allies and **partners in the Persian Gulf are increasingly nervous about America’s long-term security commitment to the region**. After all, **if the U**nited **S**tates **no longer relies on energy from the region,** why should American foot the bill for protecting the sea lanes – that backbone of the crude oil trade in the region – **or so the narrative goes**. The United States has a number of stakes in stability of the Persian Gulf oil trade even if it does rely less on oil from the region. Supply shocks will contribute to higher global oil prices, which will be felt at home. Moreover, supply shocks are damaging to our allies, particularly those in East Asia that have grown more dependent on oil and gas from the Middle East and North Africa. But there are other legitimate security concerns as well, which were not far from General Martin Dempsey’s mind when he responded to a question on Monday about how the American energy revolution will impact U.S. interests and presence in the Persian Gulf. Here’s what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said:If by 2017 the United States can achieve some level of energy independence, why in the world would we continue to be concerned about the energy that flows out of – out of the Gulf? Well, look, my answer to that is I didn’t go to the Gulf in 1991 and stay there for about the next 20 years because of oil. That’s not why I went. It’s not why my children went. It’s –and we went there because we thought that a region of the world where we had – where we had not, except for a few bilateral relationships – where we hadn’t invested much of our, let’s call it, bandwidth, intellectual energy, commitment – now, we went there in ’91 because of the – of the aggression of Saddam Hussein, but we stayed there because I think we came to the realization that the future of the region was tied to our future, and not through this thing called oil but rather through the – as I said earlier, the shared interest in a common future where people would be able to build a better life and where threats could be managed collaboratively, not by the United States uniquely but by the relationships we would build on the basis of common interests. So when I hear about in 2017, you know, oil won’t be as big a factor for us – and that’s great. I hope we do achieve energy independence. But I can assure you that at least from a military perspective – and I can only speak, as I dress, from the military perspective – that the continued development of capabilities – military capabilities, notably, in my world, but also partnerships and trust that we build by working together, by exchanging officers and noncommissioned officers in our professional military schools, that on that basis, you will find –you will find that the future will be a period of greater commitment. Now, you know, if you measure our commitment in terms of numbers of boots on the ground and numbers of aircraft and number of aircraft carriers, I think you’ll probably –you know, there’ll always be this debate about inclining or declining commitment. But that’s not what the commitment’s all about, really, in my view. As I said, I went to – I went to the Gulf in ’91, spent almost the next 20 years there on and off and didn’t do it for oil. So we have two powerful strategic cross-currents that the Obama administration will have to confront in the near term. This week marks the anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a solemn reminder for some that the United States should be less engaged in the Middle East, not more. Add this to the notion that the United States could break the tether to Middle East oil, **and the** domestic **narrative speaks for itself**. At the same time, though, a credible U.S. security commitment to our partners in the Persian Gulf may be the only way to allay concerns about security challenges in the region. Take for example, Iran. My colleagues Colin Kahl, Melissa Dalton and Matt Irvine recently published a report assessing the possibility that an Iranian bomb could lead to Saudi Arabia developing the bomb – Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia be Next? Kahl, Dalton and Irvine argue quite persuasively that a number of factors will keep Saudi Arabia from developing the bomb. But one of the big caveats to this is a credible U.S. security commitment to Saudi Arabia. Does the Royal Family in Riyadh feel comfortable about this commitment given the competing narrative that America may have an opportunity to walk away from the Persian Gulf if it doesn’t need access to the region’s oil? The public **perception on these issues - at home and abroad - will have to be managed carefully. What a tightrope to walk.**

**Cuban production trades-off with US- Mid-East oil ties**

**Alhaiji and Maris 04** – [Dr. A. F. Alhajji is an energy economist and George Patton Chair of Business and Economics at the College of Business Administration at Ohio Northern, Terry L. Maris is the founding executive director of the Center for Cuban. Business Studies and professor of management, “The Future of Cuba’s Energy Sector,” Cuba Today, 2004, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/cubatodaybookcomplete.pdf#page=105]

The current economic, political, and social trends in Cuba indicate that energy consumption will increase substantially in the future. Transition to a market economy would accelerate this trend. In this article the word “transition” refers to any movement towards a market economy. It does not necessarily mean regime change. The proximity of Cuba to the United States and the possibility of **massive oil deposits** in Cuban waters will have a tangible impact on political, economic, and social environments, not only in Cuba, but in the whole region. The discovery of commercial deposits of oil would affect Cuba’s economy on one hand and US energy policy and energy security on the other. If US-Cuba relations improve in the future, discovery of large oil deposits could affect the energy trade patterns between the two countries and affect oil trade between the US and other oil producing countries, especially in the Middle East.

**Saudi prolif causes nuclear war**

**Edelman 11** – (Eric –Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran>)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among **three** or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

# 5

**Chinese influence in Latin America is expanding at the expense of the US – it’s zero-sum**

**Martinez, 13** – Columnist for the Sun Sentinel (Guillermo I., “America Losing Influence Throughout Latin America”, SunSentinel, 5/23, <http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-05-23/news/fl-gmcol-oped0523-20130523_1_drug-cartels-latin-america-pri)//VP>

Once upon a time, as many fairy tales start, the United States was the prevailing force in Latin America. It had a coherent policy for its southern neighbors, and its opinions mattered to those who governed in the region. Despite President Barack Obama's recent trip to Mexico and Costa Rica, and Vice President Joe Biden's upcoming trip to the region, that is **no more**. The days when John F. Kennedy created the Alliance for Progress and was a hero to the young throughout the western hemisphere have been gone for more than half a century. The time when Jimmy Carter pledged to back only those governments that respected human rights and encouraged that caudillos be ousted is also a historical footnote. True, the world has changed. The attacks of September 11, 2001 made everyone look to the East; to Iraq, to Afghanistan, to Iran, Syria and other countries in the Middle East. Israel is still crucial to American foreign policy, more so now that militants are willing to die to kill Americans and Israelis. Latin America also changed when the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez was elected. The rising price of oil gave Chávez riches beyond belief and he began sharing it with similar-minded leaders in Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Argentina; just to name a few. Colombia once depended greatly on the Plan Colombia assistance from the United States to fight the FARC guerrillas and the drug lords that governed much of the country. The emphasis on the Plan Colombia since Juan Manuel Santos took office has decreased. Santos also believes in negotiations with the FARC and closer ties to those who govern in Venezuela. Mexico counted on American intelligence assistance and money to fight the drug cartels until Obama's visit to Enrique Peña Nieto, recently elected president. The communique at the end of the meeting talked about new economic cooperation between the two nations and how together they would fight the drug cartels. Not highlighted was the Mexican-imposed position that the United States agents would no longer be welcome in their country and that the cooperation would be respectful of their sovereign rights. Peña Nieto, the candidate of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) wanted a different approach to the war on drugs; one that would mitigate the violence that had killed thousands of Mexicans in the last decade. Finally, China has helped change the equation. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, for several years the United States was the only super power. When American presidents spoke, the world listened. Now China offers both a challenge to the United States, as a second super power, and has become an **alternative economic trading partner** for countries throughout the world. Still, it is inconceivable that American media and officials pay so little attention to the region. Maybe those around President Obama have not told him that Iran has close ties with Argentina, Cuba and Venezuela. Certainly the administration must know Cuba and Venezuela are so close that many critics of President Nicolás Maduro are now saying Cubans are helping to keep him in power. They talk, only part in jest, that there is a new country in the region called Cubazuela – the alliance between Cuba's Raúl Castro and Maduro's supporters is so close. It is true all have heard the main culprit of the drug trade in the world is American and European consumption. Yet the United States has waged war on the producers and importers, and not on the consumers at home. Seldom has Latin America been **further** from American influence. Many of the **leftists' presidents** in the region consider the United States their **enemy**. Others maintain cordial, or even friendly relations with Washington, but are quick to negotiate economic deals with China. The task is not easy, granted. Yet it would help if the United States and the Obama Administration articulated a policy for its neighbors in Latin America. They should not be a second thought in America foreign policy. The region deserves better. So does the United States. This country needs to improve those ties or continue to lose status as a premier world power. This is no fairy tale.

**Bolstering US engagement with Cuba undermines China’s presence in the region**

**Benjamin-Alvadaro 06 –** (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” <http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf>)

Additionally, Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and **a growing Chinese presence in the region notwithstanding**. Additionally, pursuing such a path would allow United States policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: domestic technical capabilities; continuing human capital development; strategic positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic stature. Cuba, by any measure, possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the highest ratios of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. Moreover, the foundation of Cuba’s vaunted public education system remains intact and increased investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba will continue to produce a welleducated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This raises an important consideration that being the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st century. It suffices to say that Cuba remains the strategically important state by virtue of its geographical location alone, in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government has cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that the results from improved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of improving national security concerns related to terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers and the like. Ultimately, **a successful normalization of relations** between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas may well enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen (or at a minimum, balancing) **fears of a Chinese incursion** in hemispheric affairs. To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances but have well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.

**Chinese influence in Latin America is a key to their soft power**

**Castillo 09 –** Anthony Castillo is a writer for the Diplomat, (“China in Latin America, June 18, 2009, <http://thediplomat.com/2009/06/18/china-in-latin-america/?all=true)//sawyer>

China’s aim in Latin America these days differs dramatically from the 1960s, when the Maoist revolution was the main exporting commodity into Latin America. ‘Chinese policy towards Latin America today is highly **pragmatic** rather than ideologically driven,’ Professor Gonzalo Paz, a China-Latin American expert at George Washington University told The Diplomat. Professor Paz said this is a ‘new development paradigm that seems to be attractive to Latin American countries. A sign of this new paradigm is the **growing and wider range of bilateral agreements** China has signed with Latin American countries, from education to tourism; from aviation to natural resources exploitation.The trade between China and Latin America has jumped from US$10 billion in 2000 to US$102.6 billion in 2007, and Beijing has committed to increase its direct investment by around US$50 billion over the next few years. Due to its export boom and favourable terms of trade, Latin America enjoys a healthy surplus. The Chinese diplomatic model – **soft power**, multipolar and non-interference – is considered as a real alternative to the US political and economic influence in the region.‘ South-south cooperation’, ‘strategic partnership of common development’ or ‘common understanding’ is the narrative used by Chinese leaders to frame the Sino-Latin American relationship. This has been the narrative used by the considerable number of **high-ranking Chinese officials** who have become frequent visitors to the region, including President Hu Jintao, who has visited Latin America three times in less than five years. This says a lot.Dr Adrian Hearn, a China-Latin American Researcher at the University of Sydney and author of the forthcoming book, China and Latin America: The Social Foundations of a Global Alliance, said China’s soft power, technology transfer and integrated development had been the key to this link. ‘The soft power exercised by Beijing relies heavily on the Chinese communities that began flourishing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,’ Hearn said. The first Chinese immigrants in Latin America arrived in Cuba in 1847 and since then have formed well-established Chinatowns in the majority of Latin American countries. Hearn suggests, ‘Chinatowns are **key to the soft power** exercised by China in the region.’ This is especially the case in Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica and Panama, countries with the largest number of Chinese immigrants. ‘Chinatown’s leaders play a central role in making connections and building partnerships.’

**Chinese soft power is an existential impact – it controls every scenario for extinction**

**Zhang 12 –** (Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy, “The Rise of China’s Political Softpower” 9/4/12 <http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content_26421330.htm>)

As China plays an **increasingly significant** role in the world, its **soft power** must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread **poverty**, international **conflict**, the clash of civilizations and **environmental protection**. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has **produced a more turbulent world**, as the increased risk of **terrorism threatens global security**. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more **preferable** than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being **perfected**, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of **China's** political soft power, which has **significantly** helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, **and manage global issues**. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

# 6

#### **Canadian beef exports to Cuba are high – that’s key to all beef exports and Canada’s economy.**

OMAAF 04 (Office of the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, 12/15/2004, “CUBA OPENS TO CANADIAN BEEF, NEARS AGREEMENT ON LIVE CATTLE,” http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/chat/1302193/posts)//DR. H

The Government of Canada today announced that Cuba has agreed to re-open its border to a broad range of Canadian beef products. The agreement to resume trade follows extensive discussions between Canadian and Cuban animal health and food safety officials since the discovery of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada.

Effective immediately, Cuba will accept Canadian beef and beef products from cattle of any age with minor exceptions, such as mechanically separated meat, vertebral column, trimmings, and tissues derived from the head. Cuba has also agreed to accept Canadian pet food that does not contain meat and bone meal of ruminant origin. Building on this agreement, Canadian and Cuban officials hope to agree shortly on certification requirements that would permit the importation of live Canadian cattle.

"This is a very important gain for Canada. We continue to make progress internationally, and this agreement further demonstrates the level of confidence that our trading partners have in Canada's human and animal health safeguards," said Agriculture and Agri-Food Minister Andy Mitchell.

Aside from providing immediate economic benefits to Canada, this agreement is important for Canadian exports of beef and beef products to all countries. Cuba joins a growing list of countries that have chosen to more closely align their import policies with the standards of the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). These standards clearly state that BSE should not significantly impair trade where proper safeguards are in place, as is the case in Canada.

Cuba is a significant export market for Canada. In 2002, exports of Canadian beef and beef products to Cuba totalled more than $2.2 million.

#### Removing the embargo causes a flood of US beef into Cuba.

Pearson et al 07 (Daniel, US International Trade Commission, July 2007, “U.S. Agricultural Sales to Cuba: Certain Economic Effects of U.S.

Restrictions,” http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3932.pdf)//DR. H

Lifting the financing restrictions is likely to increase U.S. beef exports to Cuba by between $5.4 million and $10 million (table 4.12). If travel restrictions were removed, it is likely that U.S. tourists would demand U.S. grain-fed beef rather than Brazilian or Uruguayan grass-fed beef. Therefore, assuming a shift in Cuba’s purchase patterns to supply the type of beef U.S. tourists are likely to demand, the U.S. beef exporters could capture a significant portion (perhaps 80 percent or more) of imports resulting from increased U.S. tourism, likely an additional $1.1 million to $3.2 million. The removal of both sets of restrictions (scenario 3) would likely increase U.S. exports of beef to Cuba by $8.8 million to $12.9 million over their 2006 level.

#### Canada’s beef industry is key to biodiversity

CAPI 12 (The Canadian Agri-Food Policy Institute, September 2012, “Canada’s

Beef Food System,” http://capi-icpa.ca/pdfs/2012/CAPI\_Beef-Food-System\_2012.pdf)//DR. H

Overall, from a societal point of view, beef production on grasslands, particularly native grasslands, contributes positively to ecosystem biodiversity. Parkland managers and scientists would agree that some level of grazing on the native prairie is key to ecological integrity. They recognize that a landscape without grazing is not ideal for native prairie wildlife. Cattle have, in effect, replaced buffalo on prairie grasslands (see map in Figure 3-6 for reference), providing a mosaic of ungrazed and grazed areas across the landscape that serves as habitat for a variety of wildlife species. Grazing is a natural disturbance, and is essential to a healthy grasslands ecosystem. Properly managed livestock grazing helps reduce the risks of a fire hazard by controlling the amount and distribution of grasses, increases the diversity of the habitat available to wildlife, and controls the growth and invasion by non-native grasses and herbs while supporting viable native populations. By managing these grasslands, the beef industry effectively preserves this natural resource (capital) base for all Canadians.

#### Extinction

Diner 94 – [David, Ph.D., Planetary Science and Geology, "The Army and the Endangered Species Act: Who's Endangering Whom?" Military Law Review, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161]

To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew 74 could save [hu]mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to[hu]man[s] in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a speciesaffects other species dependent on it. 75 Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. 4. Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. 77 As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. 78 [\*173] Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." 79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction**,** with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and**human**extinction**.** Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, 80 [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

# Credibility

#### Single issues, like the embargo, aren’t key to multilateralism.

**Lake, 10–** Professor of Social Sciences, distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego (David A., “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the Rehabilitation of US authority”, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeMakingAmericaSafe.pdf)//DR. H

President Obama and his administration appear to recognize the need to bolster the authority and legitimacy of the United States in the world. But virtue alone cannot provide credible guarantees against future US opportunism. Unipolarity is an enabling condition that persists. The problem of credibility is structural, and not one that a new administration can solve simply by a new style or approach to foreign policy. Ironically, to safeguard its authority requires that the United States embed its coercive capabilities even deeper into multilateral institutions that can provide real checks on potential opportunism.

#### Self interest blocks solvency for international law

**Tsutsui and Burton 2005** – \*Professor at the State University of New York, \*\*Professor @ Oxford University (Kiyotero and Emilie Hafner, American Journal of Sociology, 110.5, http://www.stanford.edu/~emiliehb/Papers/hr\_practices.pdf)

For others, international legal regimes can influence state behavior in important ways: regimes facilitate cooperation among sovereign states by providing coordination and commitment mechanisms that identify state obligations and provide a means of enforcement. Nevertheless, states join and comply with regimes only when it is in their rational self-interest to do so (Keohane 1984; Downs et al. 1996). Thus, although the international human rights regime may encourage state cooperation and circumscribe government repression of human rights, the pool of states that commit to these institutions should be rather limited in the first place, and compliance will heavily depend on the design of the regime.

#### The plan is distinct from what their Dickerson ev mandates is necessary – can’t solve

Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf)//DR. H

At the international political level, President Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a real step towards multilateralism and leadership. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made the following statement about then President-elect Barrack Obama’s national election. “He spoke about a “new era of global partnership…I am confident that we can look forward to an era of renewed partnership and a new multilateralism." To highlight this point further, U.N. nations have voted overwhelmingly since 1992 to overturn the Cuban Embargo. In 2007, 184 nations voted against the embargo5 - a **powerful statement** about U.S. unilateralism with regards to Cuba. The argument can also be made that the U.S. has foreign relations with China, Saudi Arabia and other non-democratic governments while applying a different standard towardsCuba. With growing perception that Cuba no longer poses a credible threat to the U.S., it appears that U.S. policy has changed from coercive to punitive following the end of the Cold War. With a renewed focus on multilateralism, President Obama could go a long way to **break this image** by spreading the seeds of a **“new beginning”** in U.S.-Cuba relations.

While dismissing Cuba’s immediate security threat to the U.S., we cannot ignore their 90-mile proximity to the U.S. shore. As we struggle to contain the illegal Mexican exodus into the U.S. and all the security concerns it poses, we neglect to see the historical similarities in past encounters with the Cuban government that led to similar incursions. So if we critically reexamine the current U.S. – Cuba embargo, why does the U.S. believe it will only lead to Cuban democratization? What about government collapse? A Cuban government collapse akin to Somalia could create a significant refugee situation not to mention an implied U.S. responsibility to provide humanitarian and even stability operations in Cuba. If catastrophe does occur, a search for causes would certainly lead back to our punitive approaches to U.S. diplomacy towards Cuba.

On the other hand, consider that foreign diplomacy achieves a breakthrough under Raul’s Cuba. It could certainly hedge our influence in Latin America. According to Dr. DeShazo, “close bilateral relationships with Venezuela is a product of Fidel Castro-Hugo Chavez friendship and does not enjoy much popular support in Cuba-nor with Raul.” If true, perhaps having a U.S. - Cuba option can become an alternative to that relationship post Fidel Castro. Loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability could be mutually beneficial - and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If negotiations break down and a decision to continue the embargo is reached, international support would be easier to garner.

Almost 21 years since the wall fell in Berlin, it is time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. This paper will further define our interests in Cuba and why President Obama should continue his quest for renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba. It will discuss potential risks associated with retaining the current 50-year diplomatic policy and give some broad suggestions regarding a new U.S. – Cuba foreign policy.

Policy and National Interest

Present U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo to coerce Cuba into establishing a representative government. While the basic policy remains unchanged, the same is not true about U.S. interests in Cuba. During the Cold War, stated U.S. interest was to contain Communism, the leading edge of which was Cuba. More than anything the U.S. wanted Castro’s demise but international support hinged on preventing the spread of communism. After 1989, communism was under siege and capitalism was on the rise. U.S. interests now shifted towards peace and regional stability. Of course, removing the Castro regime was still the preferred method, but without Soviet collusion Castro’s Cuba was no longer a credible threat to the U.S. Not surprisingly, international support quickly dwindled leaving the U.S. as the unilateral enforcer. In hindsight many argued it was the right time to loosen the embargo and seek better relations with Cuba. Instead, a renewed passion to topple Castro and establish democracy fractured any hopes to rekindle relations. In retrospect, Kennedy could not have foreseen a 50-year embargo that survives the Soviet Union’s demise but fails to remove Castro. The same cannot be said about the Obama Administration today. This section will analyze U.S. – Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years.

From 1959 to1964, beginning with President Eisenhower but shaped primarily by the Kennedy Administration, U.S. policy was to remove Fidel Castro and establish Democracy in Cuba.6 It can be argued that this policy resonates today but during the early period the U.S. actively pursued removal as the decisive action that would lead to Democracy in Cuba. Political and military efforts to remove Castro in 1961 were reinforced by the initial embargo implementation and tightening that was most effective. Between1965 and 1970, U.S. attempts to maintain a multilateral embargo failed and its effectiveness withered as western governments refused to acquiesce to U.S. - led sanctions. By the time the OAS officially lifted the embargo, Cuba had successfully diversified its trade portfolio and by 1974, 45% of Cuba’s exports came from western governments.7

The period 1965-1972, although officially endorsing the previous administration’s tough stance, largely ignored its neighbor while it dealt with the more pressing conflict in Viet Nam. Containment and a period of Presidential ambivalence towards Cuba allowed tensions to cool between nations. This coupled with a growing fatigue with the Viet Nam War resulted in a renewed engagement to normalize relations with Cuba. A policy of “rapprochement” or normalization began with the Nixon Administration and received promising traction under the Carter Administration in 1977. The rapprochement period, 1973 – 1980, was President Carter’s attempt to curtail communism in Africa and Latin America. By normalizing relations with Cuba, President Carter could leverage this good will to reverse Cuban presence in Ethiopia, Angola and Zaire. Several overt measures were taken to reduce embargo restrictions and in February, 1977 State Department spokesmen Fred Brown “publically acknowledged and accepted a Cuban proposal to begin bilateral talks on maritime boundaries and fishing rights.”8 In June, U.S. National Security Council decided to end the practice of blacklisting foreign ships that called on Cuban ports. Perhaps the most notable improvement that year was to allow foreign diplomats to occupy each other’s embassies. This allowed direct communication between countries; the previous practice had been to use Swiss and Czech proxies.9 Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress.

As President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. – Cuba relations had already soured. The Reagan Administration would reinforce the weakened embargo and a return to a containment strategy under the auspices that Cuba was “promoting terrorism and subversion in virtually every Latin American country”. But strong Congressional opposition against normalizing relations took center stage during the 1980 presidential elections. Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. 10 The White House policy was to “disrupt and destabilize the island’s economy, terminate the Cuban-Soviet alliance, end Cuba’s internationalism, and finally reinsert Cuba within the capitalist politicaleconomic orbit.”11 President Reagan made every attempt to return to an “airtight” embargo but Cuba’s persistent trade with the west subverted the effort. In fact, British and Canadian companies could conduct trade in “America’s back garden without having to compete with U.S. companies.”12 Reagan did however, exact a toll on Cuba’s economy by preventing other nations from allowing Cuba to reschedule its debt: “a process of negotiating new loans to replace existing obligations, either by lengthening maturities, deferring of loan principal payment.”13 This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained.

The last meaningful opportunity for change occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and particularly the window it presented the U.S. following the collapse in Soviet – Cuba relations. During the period 1990 – 1993, internal and economic turmoil following the Soviet Union’s break-up led to a drastic cut in Soviet subsidies and trade relations with Cuba. This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. 14 This led to a 34% drop in Cuban economy forcing Castro to renew western trade options and relook his own draconian business and commercial practices. The first Bush Administration passed on this precious opportunity, ignoring Cuba’s overt concessions late in the previous administration and choosing instead to enact the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act reversing Carter’s amendment to allow third country U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.15

By the time President Clinton came to office, momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s favor. Cuba’s economy began to rise in 1994 reaching its apex in 1996 with a 41% increase thanks to foreign investments in tourism. The introduction of the HelmsBurton legislation in 1996 gained Congressional traction after the Cuban Air force shot down two, anti-Castro “Brothers in Rescue,” planes over Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act created unrealistic expectations for the Cuban government before U.S. would loosen restrictions with Cuba. A total of eight requirements had to be met and the most controversial of these included; a transitional government in place unlike the Castro regime; the dissolution of the Department of State; Cuba must hold free and fair elections and a controversial property law that allowed property owners that left Cuba as early as 1959, to make claims in U.S. Courts on that property. With Cuba’s economy on the rise, this new measure to tighten the noose failed terribly and only succeeded in further alienating both governments.

The second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S. policy towards Cuba has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has remained steadfast and the U.S. is no closer to normalizing relations with Cuba.

A History of Anger and Distrust

After 50 years, deep-seated distrust and anger exists between the U.S. and Cuba.Perhaps an obvious assessment, but one that if ignored could undermine attempts to repair diplomatic relations between countries. Several diplomatic pitfalls developed over the years could hinder any attempt to reestablish relations. They could spell disaster and set an already tenuous relationship back decades. These triggers are subtle but recognizable over a long and tumultuous period in U.S. – Cuba relations. A historical account will help identify these political impasses and create favorable conditions for diplomatic success in future U.S. – Cuba relations.

Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian Reform Act in 1959 that nationalized agrarian land in Cuba to include U.S. owned lands? Could it have been Cuba’s decision to resume trade with the Soviet 9Union that led to a U.S. imposed embargo on Cuba in 1960? Perhaps the bigger issue was how diplomatic, economic and military efforts by both countries continued to aggravate already strained relations.16 In 1961, Cuban exiles supported by the Central Intelligence Agency failed to topple the Castro government. The Bay of Pigs fiasco sent Cuba a clear signal that the U.S. was not interested in negotiation. Castro answered immediately by allowing Soviets to position nuclear missiles in Cuba, threatening U.S. vital security and leading to the Cuban Missile Crises. These intentions have survived to the present undermining any attempt to pursue common interest and reduce tensions. The underlying fear that U.S. remains committed to toppling the Cuban government constitutes the first diplomatic pitfall in U.S. – Cuban relations. For this very reason, democratic reform will not succeed as a diplomatic bargaining tool with Cuba. Suspicions run deep among Cuban leaders and any inferences to government reform, albeit noble, will impede meaningful relations. Human rights advocacy, free trade and limited business opportunities in Cuba may be more plausible and could eventually encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba.

The embargo itself remains a perpetual albatross that continues to undermine any real diplomatic progress between nations. A series of coercive measures designed to topple the Castro regime began with U.S. – led efforts to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) in January 1962 followed by trade prohibitions on imports and exports to Cuba by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 17 This was achieved by leveraging an existing 1954 OAS Caracas Resolution designed to prevent trade with communist countries called Trading with the Enemy.18 After bilateral sanctions are established, U.S. pursued broader international support by 10enacting the October 1962 Battle Act prohibiting U.S. assistance to any country that traded with Cuba. An early attempt to persuade the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) nations to comply with the embargo yielded limited success.19 However, a new perceived security threat brought on by the Cuban Missile Crises in late 1962 gave U.S. the leverage it needed in February 1964 to convince NATO nations to effectively cease trade with Cuba. In July 1964, OAS followed NATO’s lead; U.S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its western traders.20

Tightening the noose placed extraordinary economic pressure on Cuba considering U.S. multilateral efforts reduced western trade by 73% in 1964. Cuba was obliged to subsidize this deficit with the Soviet Union and China between1961 – 1973. This trend continued by enticing Latin American and other western countries like Canada and England in the 1980s and following the Soviet fall in the 1990s.21Commensurately, Presidential administrations have loosened and tightened the embargo repeatedly as the climate between nations improved or deteriorated. The Cuban Defense Act in 1992 and the Helms Burton Act in 1996 tightened embargo restrictions signaling continued U.S. intentions to remove the Castro regime. But the U.S. - led embargo played right into Castro’s hand. Castro accused the U.S. calling it “another economic aggression” and stating that Cubans would have to undergo “long years of sacrifice.”22 By demonizing U.S. policy, he was able to galvanize Cuban support during the toughest times. The embargo helped create the American enemy, removing any popular support for rebellion and elevating Castro’s struggle to a legitimate Cuban struggle.11Castro was also complicit in the failure to mend U.S. – Cuba relations. Hiscontinued attempts to export communism began in Africa with a total 55,000 troops in Angola and Ethiopia by 1978. He focused efforts closer to Latin America by supporting Puerto Rican independence movement in 1975, the Sandinistas overthrow in Nicaragua in 1979 and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba’s support to Columbia’s M19 (Columbian Election Day April 19, 1970) guerilla movement labeled Cuba a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1982.23 Castro’s expansion efforts fueled U.S. security paranoia and prevented several overt efforts by the Carter Administration to improve relations with Cuba. In April 1980, an incident at the U.S. Mission in Havana led 120,000 Cubans to depart Mariel Port by boat to the U.S.24 The incident better known as the “Mariel Boatlift” became the tipping point that inhibited further relations with Cuba. Despite the growing tensions between the U.S. and Cuba, trade between the west and Cuba increased. NATO compliance with U.S. - brokered trade restrictions broke down after 1966 in particular due to British and Canadian opposition. U.S. efforts to use the OAS embargo to influence the United Nations also failed. In 1974, Latin American leaders pushed to end the OAS embargo. In 1975 the OAS lifted the embargo with Cuba and the embargo returned to a bilateral embargo now condemnedby most western countries.25 In 1982, Cuba’s failing economy led Castro to pursue western trade with a renewed vigor. By “1987, more than 370 firms from twenty-three European, Latin American, and Asian countries participated in Cuba’s largest ever annual trade fair.”26

Castro’s interest in improving U.S. - Cuba relations was perhaps the greatest from 1982-1988. Castro made statements in 1982 to resume talks with the U.S.; he took back more than 1000 Mariel Boatlift criminals that came to the U.S. in 1987 and pulled troops out of Angola in 1988 to mention a few. These rare moments and apparent seams in Castro’s armor were left unanswered by the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Instead renewed efforts to continue ratcheting a now largely ineffective bilateral embargo served only to increase animosity between both countries.

It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S. action over the years seems to support a hatred for Fidel Castro that interferes with any attempt to established diplomatic relations with Cuba. If true, to neglect this assumption could undermine any efforts to reverse our seemingly punitive approach. Perhaps it can be traced to his support for a Soviet-style communism. After all, few things in 1960 America were feared and despised more than communism. Any country affiliated with the communist movement became an affront to the American way of life. Furthermore, Americans shed blood in Cuba during the 1898 Spanish American War leading to Cuban Independence in 1902.27 Fidel Castro became evil’s face in Cuba and any attempt to partner with Castro seemed equally tainted. Fast forwarding to the present, with communism no longer a threat, perhaps it’s time to let the anger fade and deal with Cuba for its’ diplomatic merit not past indiscretions. The question remains whether clear objectiveness leads U.S. diplomatic efforts with Cuba? It is important to note that what’s at stake here is U.S. national interests and not the legacy of Fidel Castro.

Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and economic engagement in Cuba. If democracy is virtuous, then why must we exploit it? It casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a common perception that U.S. policy with regards to security and stability can only exist under the precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”. It has prevented any real progress in U.S. – Cuba relations because of well placed fears that we mean to subvert the Cuban government. A popular Cuban American lobby group, The Cuban American National Foundation summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba. They suggest, “U.S. – Cuba policy should focus on (1) advancing U.S. interests and security in the region and (2) empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and prosperity…that these are “intertwined and one cannot be individually accomplished without the other.”28 The recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba.

To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. Focusing on better diplomatic relations could further democracy as a byproduct of increased exposure to open markets, businesses and globalization. China is a good example. The U.S. has diffused tensions with China by exposing them to open markets. Although they continue to embrace communism, their version of communism has been somewhat diluted as they modified their business practices, trade and other aspects to compete in the global marketplace. If you take into account that Cuba’s Growth National Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while their debt grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008, Cuba certainly has incentive to do the same.29 By imposing democracy we jeopardize diplomatic avenues to our principal security and stability pursuits. To assuage the Cuban America position on this issue may be simpler today than 10 years ago. Today’s younger Cuban-American generation is more amenable to closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their immigrant forefathers14after 50 years may be passing and perhaps the time is right to leverage this new Cuban American generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied to negotiations.

As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate results and a Cuban government anxious to please the U.S. We should expect a cautious and limited first engagement that appears noticeably weighted in U.S. effort. Let us assume the U.S. makes significant diplomatic and economic concessions but Cuba is less willing to provide some reciprocal offering. U.S. policy could conclude that Cuba has no genuine desire to consummate new diplomatic relations and diplomacy could fail. It is imperative to understand that the U.S. has done most of the “taking” and hence will, at least for the near future, do most of the “giving”. A steady, patient and continued engagement is needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations.

Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis

Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified for future improvement.

The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is whether it’s feasible to continue the current policy. At least for the foreseeable future, the answer is yes. It equates to doing nothing diplomatically, militarily and economically. Perhaps this 15option is appealing given a robust domestic agenda and U.S. involvement in two wars. According to Professor Schwab and other experts however, the U.S. has lost the information campaign targeted at the Cuban people. It has only, “buttressed Fidel’s popularity in Cuba and elsewhere, which eviscerates the very purposes the embargo was set up for.”30 It’s like the classic biblical story of David triumphing over Goliath – the bigger the oppressor the greater the victory. True or not, Fidel has made the case successfully to the Cuban people. While it’s feasible for the U.S. to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will succeed.

How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three elements of national power that highlight our current policy: diplomacy, economy and law enforcement. It is subjective to evaluate acceptability strictly in terms of current national power invested and subsequent pay offs in foreign policy. U.S. needs international cooperation to achieve the coercive effects that only complete economic strangulation can accomplish. This is tough to do and North Korea and Iran bear this true. If we look at it from a broader international and economic perspective we can begin to see why it’s not acceptable. Take a UN General Assembly vote renouncing the U.S.-led embargo on Cuba for instance; since1992 there has been overwhelming vote to end the embargo.31 In essence, it has garnered sympathy for Castro and encouraged western nations like Canada and Spain to continue open relations with Cuba. Even if the embargo could work, U.S. diplomacy has failed to yield the international tourniquet needed to bring change in Cuba. Applying economic force without first garnering the necessary diplomatic support failed to achieve intended changes succeeding instead in hurting the Cuban people it hoped to protect. Whether or not an embargo can work in Cuba is suspect but succeeding without international support is impossible. Since the embargo hinges on a larger multinational participation, international and not just U.S. acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba.

Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on Cuba. These restrictions have placed a heavy burden on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) particularly in Miami. A 2007 GAO report highlights these burdens and how they impede other more important Law Enforcement activities in defense of the homeland.32 GAO findings suggest there’s a real need to balance U.S. paranoia for “everything Cuba.” This rebalancing purports an unacceptable cost-benefit to the current law enforcement aspect of the embargo. It diminishes our greater need to defend against terrorist, criminals and other real threats to our national security. In essence, our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable tradeoffs for homeland security.

In the final analysis, U.S. – Cuba policy is not sustainable because it has failed to meet desired national ends: Cuban democracy and human rights. Prior to 1989, the U.S. could make the argument that the embargo contained communism and generally marginalized the Castro government. It failed however, to depose Fidel Castro and democratize the Cuban government. A post Cold War Cuba no longer poses a threat to the U.S. - communism is contained and Cuba is still under embargo. Despite a 50-year failure to affect change in Castro’s government, our policy with regards to Cuba remains unchanged. We have foregone diplomatic engagement and chosen coercive economic power as our only political tool.

Does Cuba Pose A Security Threat to the U.S.?

Let’s begin by asking this question: can we afford to escort commerce through Caribbean waters from Cuban pirates? This sounds as farfetched as an attack from an Afghan-based Al-Qaida using commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This scenario while unexpected is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. The greater possibility that “something” unfavorable happens in Cuba that threatens U.S. national interests is certainly more relevant. Although Cuba poses no traditional threats to the U.S., geographically, their 90-mile proximity should concern us. Our proximity to Cuba assures U.S. involvement, be it voluntary or involuntary, in a major crisis. Consider a disease outbreak that begins in Cuba over a break down in hygiene, government pollution or other misfortune attributable to economic strife. The disease has no boundaries and quickly reaches the Florida shores via travelling Cuban American citizens. This scenario could be mitigated or even preventable under the auspices of better relations. Aside from the obvious medical benefits a partnership provides, established communications with Cuba would likely prevent an uncontrolled spread in the U.S. There are definite advantages to having healthy regional partnerships to deal with regional problems.

While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a government collapse. If Cuba becomes a “failing” or “failed state” we could see a huge refugee flood into the U.S., increased crime and drug trafficking across U.S. borders, and renewed security and stability issue in the region. In 1980, 120,000 Cuban refugees fled Mariel and 20,000 more in 1994 after Cuba declared an open immigration policy.33 From 2004 – 2007, 131,000 Cubans have made residence in the U.S. Almost 38,000 settled in Florida alone in 2006. Although it’s mere speculation to presume Cuba will fail, if it did, there is no question where Cubans would seek refuge. A failed state could eventually draw U.S. involvement into nation building in Cuba taking a greater toll on our national resources. This scenario, while unexpected, is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. Current U.S. policy is no longer a sustainable option to achieving our national interests in Cuba. Until realignment can bring national policy back in line with national interests, conditions will not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations.

Proposed U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis

If today marks President Obama’s “new strategy” towards Cuba we must begin with U.S. National interests in the broader Latin American context. Over the past 50 years our approach has been germane to Cuba and not the larger Latin American construct. In so doing we have isolated Cuba from Latin America for coercive reasons yes, but also for the very democratic principles we hoped Cuba would follow.

The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (covers Canada and Cuba) has set the following goals for the region: “Economic partners that are democratic, stable, and prosperous; Friendly neighbors that help secure our region against terrorism and illegal drugs; Nations that work together in the world to advance shared political and economic values.”34 To simplify these goals, let us just say stability, economic prosperity and democracy. Using these as a benchmark, I propose our new diplomatic strategy towards Cuba must be similar - achieve economic stability, security and a representative government as the “end state” goal and not the prerequisite for engagement. President Obama can implement this policy by first building American and Congressional support for engagement. He should establish a formal infrastructure that communicates to Cuba and the International Community at large that we’re serious about diplomatic engagement with Cuba. Finally, we must loosen embargo restrictions and expose Cubans to U.S. open markets, business opportunities and 21st Century living. This combination will improve relations with Cuba by regaining their trust, improving their living conditions and exposing them to the democratic enticements we hope they will emulate.

Achieving Congressional approval will be difficult although not impossible in the present economic recession. The economic benefits associated with new business opportunities in Cuba can encourage skeptics in Congress to mobilize. As a counterargument to a continued embargo, the President can point to the dangers associated with failed states like Somalia inadvertently caused by the very environment sanctions create. A strong communication strategy to gain American support coupled with a softening Cuban American stance, shrouded in economic opportunity, could encourage Congressional dialogue and resolution. President Obama can succeed if he sets realistic goals and expresses these to the American public before the media or his opposition defines these.

We’ve established that coercive means have failed to achieve democracy and economic stability in Cuba. I’m suggesting there is another mutually beneficial alternative. Using China as an example, their exposure and need to compete in free global markets broadened their horizons and shifted their hard line communist approach to international diplomacy. This was a feat that coercive diplomacy has not accomplished in Cuba. Yet we still have civil disagreements with China on human rights issues, Taiwan’s right to independence and other contentious issues without resorting to coercive measures. Why should Cuba receive different treatment? The confusion lies with our tendency to impose democracy as a precondition for diplomatic relations. How can Cuba subscribe to small business practices, a free economy building block, if business opportunities are not available? Diplomatic engagement and economic encouragement has a better chance. Cuba’s economic condition incentivizes their willingness to begin diplomatic negotiations. The U.S. should begin by focusing efforts to establish diplomatic relations through incentives rather than coercion. We must also set the democratic precondition aside to pursue when the relationship matures and trust is reestablished. Exposing them to new opportunities will eventually, through their own discovery and U.S. shepherding, lead them to a more representative government.

If we accept that reestablishing relations with Cuba is the first real step to a democratic end-state then the first action must be to appoint an Ambassador to Cuba. This diplomatic gesture signals that U.S. is serious about foreign relations. The Ambassador’s first actions must include setting the conditions with Cuba to allow a loosening of embargo restrictions. President Obama, in the spirit of multilateralism, should pursue international solidarity since some countries enjoying exclusive trade with Cuba would certainly protest the immediate competition. Choosing a time-phased removal would protect U.S. assets and interests in the remote possibility that Cuba fails to comply with the agreed bi-national or international terms. It might also sooth domestic and partisan anxiety regarding open trade with Cuba. President Obama must accomplish this early in his first term to allow time to reap success or mitigate failure before the next elections.

The U.S. cannot afford to miss another opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba. A Cuba without Fidel is an opportunity – whether it is Raul or his replacement in 2013. The U.S. must lay the foundation today for renewed U.S. Cuba relations. Delaying could also signal the contrary to Raul Castro suspiciously awaiting the true purpose of recent U.S. concessions.

While a long term goal may be to influence change in government, it cannot be the basis for initial success and continued diplomacy. With diplomatic patience and a prosperous Cuba, we have reason to believe, like China and Russia that capitalism will prevail over communism. But new politicians and a younger generation of Americans who measure success between terms and administrations will not understand if results aren’t immediate or commensurate to U.S. efforts. Instead, the strategy pursued must occur with a measured diplomatic optimism that insures immediate setbacks don’t derail the restoration of trust that must occur before complete reciprocation can be expected.

Conclusion

Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish.

If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism. Success in Cuba could afford the **international momentum** and **credibility** to solve other seemingly “wicked problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir. President Obama could **leverage** this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea who might associate their plight with Cuba.35 The U.S. could begin to **lead again** and reverse its perceived **decline** in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come.

#### Multilateralism empirically doesn’t solve anything – four reasons

**Harvey 04** – University Research Professor of International Relations, professor in the Department of Political Science, and the director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University (Frank, Smoke And Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism And The Illusion Of Multilateral Security, p. 43-45) // MS

The typical argument favouring multilateralism is a simple one, sum- marized by Ramesh Thakur: ‘Because the world is essentially anarchi- cal, it is fundamentally insecure, characterized by strategic uncertainty and complexity because of too many actors with multiple goals and interests and variable capabilities and convictions. Collective action embedded in international institutions that mirror mainly U.S. value preferences and interests enhances predictability, reduces uncertainty, and cuts the transaction costs of intemational action.’" With respect to peacekeeping, for example, Thakur argues that if ‘the UN helps to mute the costs and spread the risks of the terms of intemational engagement to maximise these benefits, the United States will need to instill in others, as well as itself embrace, the principle of multilateralism as a norm in its own right: states must do X because the United Nations has called for X, and good states do what the United Nations asks them to do.’l2 But there are several problems with Thakur's defence of collective action and associated policy recommendations, particularly in relation to multilateral approaches to security in a post-9/11 setting. First, and foremost, state leaders often **refuse to do what the UN asks** of them, are often more than prepared to have their publics suffer the consequences of whatever sanctions the UN can mount, and are rarely directly affected by the sanctions that are implemented – assuming the permanent members of the Security Council find it in their collective interest to implement a sanctions regime in the first place. The lessons from UN intervention and sanction efforts over the past decade are not at all encouraging in this regard. Second, many state and non-state actors fall outside the institutional constraints imposed on the system through global norms and regimes. As the capacity spreads for smaller and smaller groups to inflict increasingly devastating levels of damage on larger states, international institutions will **lose the capacity** to force or coerce compliance with international law. Consequently, leaders of major powers, such as the United States, will be compelled to respond to security threats through **unilateral** initiatives. This compulsion will force other powers to push that much harder to control American impulses by demanding that multilateral consensus remain the sole guarantor of legitimacy. These **tensions will be exacerbated** by the prevailing perception in the United States that these same multilateral institutions are constraining the power and capacity of the U.S. government to protect American citizens from emerging threats of terrorism and proliferation. Third, the collective-action argument put forward by Thai-cur typically (and erroneously) assumes that most states are governed by a similar set of political priorities, share common concerns about similar combinations of security threats, are stimulated into action (or inaction) by the same set of economic imperatives, are inspired by a common set of interests and overarching values (such as peace, security, stability), and are encouraged by their respective publics to meet their demands for a common set of public goods. But the **differences**, tensions, and overall level of competition among states in the system are **far greater** than proponents of multilateralism acknowledge. Some states are more threatened by terrorism and proliferation than others, have more substantial and direct economic interest in particular regions, are less interested in securing peace, and experience pressure from their respective publics to pursue very distinct foreign and security policies. Consequently, there is no guarantee that a collection of states will have the same motivation to change the status quo, or experience the same imperative to address the same security threats with the same level of resolve, commitment, or resources (relative to their size). In sum, multi- lateral organizations are less likely today to act with the same level of urgency to address security threats that Washington considers imperative. The costs of inaction (derived from exclusive reliance on multilateral consensus) are now perceived as being higher than the costs of unilateralism. Although similar threats may have guided collective action through multilateral alliances for much of the cold war, these imperatives were a product of a common Soviet threat. But threats today are many and varied, and few states share the same concerns or face the same obligations to respond. No case more clearly illustrates the growing divisions among former allies than the 2003 Iraq war. Fourth, decreasing transaction costs may be a valid argument in favour of multilateral cooperation in some cases (e. g., to facilitate post- conflict reconstruction, political reforms, democratization, elections run by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, food aid, water distribution, and the provision of medical supplies and facilities), but this is not true for all security challenges. In a post-9/11 environment, the transaction costs that are saved through joint efforts will always be compared with the costs of depending exclusively on collective-action mechanisms that ultimately may fail - multilateralism is not free of costs or risks. For example, one of the many important lessons of the 2003 Iraq war, at least for American officials, is that there are **no collective-security guarantees** any longer, even from traditional allies. The UN Security Council did not function as a separate entity committed to facilitating and coordinating diplomatic exchanges towards a common good. The UN functions in a highly competitive environment in which traditional power politics plays out. Proponents of multilateralism through the UNSC do not espouse that doctrine in the interest of global security; their efforts are typically designed to use the institution to limit the capacity of the U.S. to act unilaterally to protect American interests. That level of competition, itself driven by competing interpretations of interests, values, and threats, does not lend itself well to the kind of multilateralism its proponents aspire to achieve. Of course, if France shared the same concerns about terrorism, or if leaders in Paris were equally motivated to address the potential for WMD proliferation in and through Iraq, the transaction costs incurred by responding through the UN would be more acceptable. But as threat perceptions continue to **diverge**, the risks associated with waiting for multilateral consensus are simply **too high**. The complex nature of contemporary security threats virtually guarantees that similar conflicts will plague multilateral institutions in the future.

#### The world is moving to pluralism, not multi-polarity – the US can still maintain unipolar leadership because most challengers are regional

**Etzioni, 13** – served as a senior advisor to the Carter White House; taught at Columbia University, Harvard University and The University of California at Berkeley; and is currently a university professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University (Amitai, “The Devolution of American Power” 37 Fletcher F. World Aff. 13, lexis)

The theory that the world is moving from a unipolar order, dominated by the United States, to a multipolar distribution of power has led to a robust debate concerning the consequences of this change on the international order. However, the global power distribution is currently following a different pattern. Instead of what is conventionally addressed as a global unipolar to multipolar shift, in fact rising powers are mainly regional powers, not global ones, although they may have global reach. This pattern should be expected to continue in the near future and should be accounted for in order to make sound policy.

It follows that the movement away from a unipolar world should not be equated with one in which more global powers contend with each other; nor should it be equated with a world in which new powers take over from an old, declining power. Moreover, it should not be assumed that the world will be less ordered. Instead, to a significant extent, the change seems to be toward more regional autonomy, or increased devolution, and greater variety in the relationships between the United States and regional powers. These relationships may see regional powers serve as junior partners to the global power and assume some of the global power's regional responsibilities. Or these relationships may produce junior adversarial regional powers that seek greater relative regional control in defiance of the United States, but seek at most limited realignment of power on the global stage.

In the process of devolution, the increase in regional self-government and pluralism are much less challenging to the global power than [\*14] the redistribution of power implied by multipolarity. Indeed, as junior regional powers increasingly act as partners and assume regional responsibilities, they enable the global power to scale back its global commitments without losing much of its weight in international developments. Similarly, the desire for regional control among rising powers can be more readily accommodated than aspirations to challenge the United States as a global superpower.

It must be noted that the notion of devolution as used here is that of an ideal, n1 and as such there will be significant variation in its real-world instantiations. However, the process of devolution suggests a logical pattern of behavior for all actors involved, upon which various powers can construct a viable strategy.

While the movement from a uni- to a multipolar distribution of global power is considered by some to be "positive" and more supportive of international institutions, n2 others consider it as "negative" and likely to lead to confrontation between the declining power and the rising ones. n3 In truth, the move to a higher level of regional pluralism is a double-edged sword. The effect of the transformation depends on the particular accommodation pattern that develops between each regional power and the global power. As indicated previously, this pattern can vary from that of a junior partner to that of a regional antagonist.

Stated in other terms, if unipolarity is compared to hierarchy and multipolarity is compared to flat systems or networks, regional pluralism is analogous to increased subsidiarity.

Importantly, the accommodation pattern between the global superpower and regional powers is fundamentally different from the one between declining and rising global powers. In the former case, the regional powers do not seek to modify or replace the global rules or change the global distribution of public goods. Instead, they aim merely to gain local exemptions from the rules, variants in the ways they are applied, or increases in their share of distributed benefits. Superpowers may prove unwilling to accommodate such regional challenges and regional challengers may hold that they have been insufficiently accommodated. [\*15] However, such global/regional accommodations are, in general, easier to reach than the global/global accommodations between declining and rising global powers, and thus are less likely to lead to outright conflicts. With devolution, the central power yields, therefore risking much less when pluralism increases than when a transition from uni- to multipolarity takes place. This is one of the principle strengths of pluralism.

# Ethanol

#### Sugar industry’s key to Brazil’s economy.

SC 12 (Sugarcane.org, AT: Website’s Bias!!! – Cites objective data…, 6/19/12, “Impact on Brazil's Economy,” http://sugarcane.org/the-brazilian-experience/impact-on-brazils-economy)//DR. H

The sugarcane industry – including cultivation, processing and refined products – represents an important segment of the Brazilian economy.

Economic Contribution

In 2010, the sugarcane sector contributes US$50 billion to Brazil’s gross domestic product (GDP) – equivalent to almost 2.4% of the entire Brazilian economy and comparable to the GDP of a European country like Slovenia (US$47.7 billion).

When you add in the various suppliers and stakeholders who depend on Brazil’s sugarcane industry, the entire sugarcane agro-industrial system generates gross revenues totaling more than US$86 billion annually.

Good Jobs

The sugarcane industry employs 1.28 million workers, according to 2008 data from the Ministry of Labor and Employment’s Annual Report of Social Information (RAIS).

#### Brazil economic instability causes nuclear war.

Shulz 2k(Donald, Research Professor of National Security Policy at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: SHAPING AN ELUSIVE FUTURE, March)

While we are in a speculative mode, it may be useful to raise the issue of whether, two or three decades from now, the United States might have to deal with a regional hegemon or peer competitor. The most obvious candidate for such a role would be Brazil, which already accounts for almost half of Latin America’s economic production and has by far the largest armed forces in the region (313,250 active troops).53 That country could very well assume a more commanding political and military role in the decades ahead. Until recently, the primary U.S. concern about Brazil has been that it might acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In the 1970s, the Brazilian military embarked on a secret program to develop an atom bomb. By the late 1980s, both Brazil and Argentina were aggressively pursuing nuclear development programs that had clear military spin-offs.54 There were powerful military and civilian advocates of developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within both countries. Today, however, the situation has changed. As a result of political leadership transitions in both countries, Brazil and Argentina now appear firmly committed to restricting their nuclear programs to peaceful purposes. They have entered into various nuclear-related agreements with each other—most notably the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement (1991), which permits the inspection of all their nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy Agency—and have joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even so, no one can be certain about the future. As Scott Tollefson has observed: . . . the military application of Brazil’s nuclear and space programs depends less on technological considerations than on political will. While technological constraints present a formidable barrier to achieving nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles, that barrier is not insurmountable. The critical element, therefore, in determining the applications of Brazil’s nuclear and space technologies will be primarily political.55 Put simply, if changes in political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazil’s nuclear program towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous orientations. Civilian supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept away by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of the current democratic experiment were to be undermined by economic crisis and growing poverty/inequality. Nor are civilian leaders necessarily less militaristic or more committed to democracy than the military. The example of Peru’s Fujimori comes immediately to mind. How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? It has been estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis (Angra I) were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would have a capability three times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial missile producing capability. On the other hand, the country has a very limited capacity to project its military power via air and sealift or to sustain its forces over long distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes significant military manpower increases (which could place Brazil at a numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran and Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a lack of economic resources. Indeed, the development of all these military potentials has been, and will continue to be, severely constrained by a lack of money. (Which is one reason Brazil decided to engage in arms control with Argentina in the first place.) 56 In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism, imbued with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, is not unthinkable, and such a regime could present some fairly serious problems. That government would probably need foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justify its existence. One obvious candidate would be the United States, which would presumably be critical of any return to dictatorial rule. Beyond this, moreover, the spectre of a predatory international community, covetous of the riches of the Amazon, could help rally political support to the regime. For years, some Brazilian military officers have been warning of “foreign intervention.” Indeed, as far back as 1991 General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, then chief of the Military Command of the Amazon, threatened to transform the region into a “new Vietnam” if developed countries tried to “internationalize” the Amazon. Subsequently, in 1993, U.S.-Guyanese combined military exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an angry response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers. 57 Since then, of course, U.S.-Brazilian relations have improved considerably. Nevertheless, the basic U.S./ international concerns over the Amazon—the threat to the region’s ecology through burning and deforestation, the presence of narcotrafficking activities, the Indian question, etc.—have not disappeared, and some may very well intensify in the years ahead. At the same time, if the growing trend towards subregional economic groupings—in particular, MERCOSUR—continues, it is likely to increase competition between Southern Cone and NAFTA countries. Economic conflicts, in turn, may be expected to intensify political differences, and could lead to heightened politico-military rivalry between different blocs or coalitions in the hemisphere. Even so, there continue to be traditional rivalries and conflicts within MERCOSUR, especially between Brazil and its neighbors, and these will certainly complicate the group’s evolution. Among other things, the past year witnessed a serious deterioration of relations between Brazil and Argentina, the product partly of the former’s January 1999 currency devaluation, which severely strained economic ties between the two countries. In part, too, these conflicts were aggravated by Argentina’s (unsuccessful) bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Brazilians interpreted as an attempt to gain strategic advantage. The upshot was that relations soured to the extent where questions have been raised as to the continued viability of MERCOSUR itself. In light of these problems, one cannot but wonder what impact a resurgence of Brazilian authoritarianism, combined with a push for regional hegemonic status, would have on Argentina, currently a “non-NATO ally” of the United States.

#### No Internal link –

#### Not enough sugar and Castro says no.

Sanchez ‘11

Adriana E. Sanchez, NotiEn, News Agency, 2011, “Biofuels Fighting for Space in Central America and Cuba,” http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/12797/Biofuels%20Fighting%20for%20Space%20in%20Central%20America%20and%20Cuba.pdf?sequence=1

Similar to Central America, Cuba’s potential to become a leader in biofuel production is subject to speculation, and it will be strongly tied to the energy policy that the island adopts within the next few years. The Association for the Study of Cuban Economy (ASCE) says sugarcane could seemingly provide the raw material for biofuel production. But tight supplies might be a problem. The island nation is expected to produce only 1.2 million tons of raw sugar. This is a very small amount when compared to sugar production in the 1990s, which was estimated to reach 7 million to 8 million tons per year. With its current sugarcane output, Cuba could produce an estimated 3.2 billion gallons of ethanol per year, energy industry sources say. ¶ In an interview with NotiEn, Jorge Piñón, a well-known expert on Cuban energy policy, suggested that Cuba would have to stop its dependence on fossil fuels from foreign countries if it is to develop energy independence. "Cuba passed from papa Russia to papa Venezuela to solve its population’s energy demand," said Piñón. "Cuba must strive to start working on an energy policy that can help the country independent of who is in power." ¶ Piñón said ethanol production has not been more actively promoted because of the complicated relation that Cuba has had with sugarcane. "Fidel Castro puts his foot down every time there are talks about an increase in ethanol production; for him it is a political issue," said Piñón, a visiting research fellow at the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center and an analyst for the Center for Hemispheric Policy at the University of Miami.

**And, Brazil would just replace expansion into Cerrado with another commodity like soy beans**

#### No warming and it's definitely not anthro – WE control quals, bias and recency

Burnett, 12 – Sterling, Ph.D., Senior Fellow in Environment and Energy at the National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA), “Fraud and Heartland: A Scandal for Climate Alarmists, not Skeptics,” 2-22, http://environmentblog.ncpa.org/fraud-and-heartland-a-scandal-for-climate-alarmists-not-skeptics/.

Sadly (for him), Peter Gleick, the researcher at issue, could have obtained a good deal of the information he sought through a request for Heartland’s 990, a tax document that non-profits have to provide to any who request it. Rather than going through legitimate channels to obtain what information he could or, better still, questioning the veracity of the initial document he received — and there were many reasons to question that document, among them the fact that it was delivered to him anonymously — using someone else’s name, a Heartland board member — he requested internal documents. Despite all the sound and fury surrounding this episode over the last week, really, nothing new was learned in the memos. As Time Magazine summed it up: “The alleged memos seem to confirm that the Heartland Institute is trying to push it’s highly skeptical view of climate science into the public sphere, which is only surprising if you’ve paid exactly zero attention to the climate debate over the past decade.” Gleick admits that his actions were wrong and apologized but said he did it out of “frustration.” One has to ask, frustration over what? Is he perhaps frustrated with the fact that he and his fellow climate alarmists have, as of yet, been unable to convince Americans that the scientific case for climate action is settled and stampede them into calling for policies that forcibly restrict energy use? Daily polls show more American’s are coming to doubt the argument that human actions are causing a warming that would result in catastrophic climate change. Or perhaps he is frustrated with the fact that an increasing number of scientists – scientists with as good or better credentials and reputations as those who argue that humans are causing warming — continue to highlight the weakness, discrepancies and contradictions that continue to plague global warming theory and demonstrate that the case in far from closed. Perhaps Glieck and his ilk are frustrated because they constantly bray that scientists and think tanks that show skepticism concerning one or another critical point of global warming theory are exceedingly well-funded; when the reality is, and Gleick knows it, these scientists and think tanks are very modestly funded when compared to the billions that are spent to on climate research, politics and on politically favored technologies by governments, billionaires and corporations who will benefit from climate policies, and the non-profit foundations and think tanks that want to use fear of global warming to reshape the Western economic system into what they believe would be a more humane, equitable (socialist), global version of society. A society where international bodies, with bureaucracies staffed by “experts” beyond the reach of crass democratic politics and mass opinion will steer the ship of global-state in the direction of the “true” public good. Time magazine notes that if anything, the Heartland memos debunk the idea of a well-funded “. . . vast right-wing conspiracy,” behind global warming skepticism. Who says the Progressive era has passed?

**Can’t solve Cerado destruction.**

WWF 11 (World Wildlife Fund‎, 2011, “Soya and the Cerrado: Brazil’s forgotten jewel,” http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/soya\_and\_the\_cerrado.pdf)//DR. H

The export earnings from soya have come at a cost to the ecosystems in which it has been planted. For example, soya expansion has been a significant factor in conversion of the Brazilian Cerrado or savannah, a biodiversity hotspot larger than Mexico. A recent survey suggested that nearly half the original vegetation cover had been lost by 2008, and that it is disappearing considerably faster than the Amazon forest.

#### Ecosystems are historically resilient and invasive species and human interference are net-better

Pearce, 6/3 – author and journalist (Fred, “Humans Have Shaped Earth for Millenia,” *The Breakthrough,* 6/3/13, http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/programs/conservation-and-development/humanitys-pervasive-environmental-influence-began-long-ago/, SMS)

Are there any pristine ecosystems out there? The evidence is growing that our ideas about virgin nature are often faulty. In fact, the lush rainforest or wind-blown moorland we think is natural may be a human creation, with alien creatures from distant lands living beside native species. Realizing this will change our ideas about how ecosystems work and how we should do conservation. We like to think that most nature was pristine and largely untouched until recent times. But two major studies in recent weeks say we are deluded. In one, Erle Ellis, a geographer at the University of Maryland Baltimore County, and colleagues have calculated that at least a fifth of the land across most of the world [had been transformed by humans as early as 5,000 years ago](http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2013/04/25/1217241110.abstract?sid=6319bf04-8bc6-46c6-8f40-d72ea4e02a18) — a proportion that past studies of historical land use had assumed was only reached in the past 100 years or so. The human footprint was huge from the day, perhaps 60,000 years ago, when we began burning grasslands and forests for hunting, according to the Ellis study. It extended further with swidden “slash-and-burn” agriculture, and became more intense when farmers began to domesticate animals and plow the land. This seems odd given how few we were back then — tens of millions at most — and how primitive our technology was. But, says co-author Steve Vavrus of the University of Wisconsin, “early farmers didn’t need to be as efficient as modern farmers and therefore, counterintuitively, they used much more land per capita.” In other words, they spread out.¶ In fact, they farmed large areas that today look like virgin forests. But we now know that as much as a tenth of the trees in the Amazon rainforest grow on man-made “dark earths,” or terra preta, which archaeologists believe were created by pre-Columbian farmers who added organic wastes and charcoal to improve nutrient supply and boost yields. Much of the Amazon, Ellis concludes, is actually forest regrowth. Or — judging by the profusion of fruit trees and other valuable species still growing in terra preta areas – perhaps overgrown gardens. Other tropical rainforests also seem to have been farmed. In the past couple of years, James Fraser of Lancaster University in England has found dark earths in until-recently forested West Africa. And last year Doug Sheil and colleagues reported similar findings from Borneo. Other studies have found oil-palm nuts over wide areas of the central African jungle, suggesting the place was covered in palm-oil plantations 2,000 years ago.¶ Nor is this just about rainforests. The bison-grazed plains of North America were remade by Native Americans long before Europeans showed up. Many of the mist-shrouded treeless grasslands of the tropical Andes, known as the paramos, are the result of burning and grazing after locals cut down the natural forests centuries ago. In colder climes, the Scottish highlands tell a similar story. Just as geographers and archaeologists are hard-pressed to find untouched landscapes, so biologists are having similar trouble locating pristine ecosystems.¶ A new book, Novel Ecosystems, edited by Richard Hobbs of the University of Western Australia and others, shows how many superficially natural ecosystems are heavily influenced by the introduction of alien species. Whether intentional or accidental, most introductions seem to have human origins.¶ This is disconcerting. “Over large parts of the globe, the ‘wilderness’ that people refer back to never existed,” says one of the book’s authors, Michael Perring, also of the University of Western Australia.¶ Nature has always had open borders for alien species on the move. Those itinerants may have been a driving force of evolution. But human activity has dramatically increased their travel options. We move many deliberately, as commercial crops or domesticated animals, for instance. Today, others can hitch a ride on ship hulls or in ballast tanks, aboard planes or on the wheels of trucks or the backs of domesticated animals. This phenomenon seems to have been going on for much longer than we sometimes imagine. Conventionally, we regard these unwanted interlopers as a curse, destabilizing ecosystems and devouring indigenous species. Sometimes this is true, as Hobbs and his co-authors acknowledge. But they point out that, in the 21st century, aliens make up a substantial fraction of the planet’s biodiversity, and many are actively useful, even essential parts of ecosystems. Extinctions caused by new arrivals happen and can sometimes be devastating. The brown tree snake from New Guinea is eating its way through the wildlife of Guam, after arriving on a military plane. The zebra mussel, which came from the Black Sea region in the ballast water of ships, is notorious in the U.S., which returned the favor by inadvertently sending the Black Sea a jellyfish that devastated that ecosystem. But actually, such events are rare. Mostly, invaders swiftly settle down and become model eco-citizens, pollinating crops, spreading seeds, controlling predators, and providing food and habitat for native species. After a while we forget about them, or learn to love them. Where would North American be without the European honeybee? Usually, invaded ecosystems end up with more species than they had before. Places like New Zealand, Hawaii, even the Galapagos islands — all notorious for species invasions due to human activities — are actually all more biodiverse than before. Ellis calls them “anthropogenic melting pots.” Scientists who research the invaders and their hosts are discovering much that is intriguing. British researchers recently reported finding two species of native tits that have learned to eat the larvae of a wasp that was introduced to the country from the Middle East 180 years ago and that lays its eggs on the Turkey oak, another introduced species. The tits are spending more and more time in the trees, eating the larvae, especially in spring because climate change means their young now hatch before their previous food source, leaf-eating moth caterpillars appear.¶ Novel ecosystems are different, but not necessarily worse. San Francisco Bay, for instance, is widely regarded [as the most invaded estuary on the planet](http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-news-archives-2013-usa-35/main/ramsar/1-26-45-590%5E26050_4000_0). But that didn’t stop the U.S. government submitting it in January to the Ramsar Convention as a wetland of international importance, because of is a “key habitat for a broad suite of flora and fauna and a range of ecological services.” Much of its rich biodioversity — and some of its ecological services — is due to its alien species. Aliens may even contribute to rewilding those parts of the planet we no longer need. In Puerto Rico, abandoned sugarcane fields across half the island have sprouted new forest ecosystems, largely thanks to the invasive power of non-native species such as the African tulip tree, says Ariel Lugo of the International Institute of tropical Forestry. The tulip tree proved attractive to native birds and insects and now, after a few decades, native trees species have started to recover too.

#### Multiple alt causes to solvency- human growth, habitat destruction, pollution, agriculture, warming, and forest fragmentation

**RCF, 13** – Rainforest Conservation Fund (“5) Causes of Recent Declines in Biodiversity”, 2013, Rainforest Conservation Fund, http://www.rainforestconservation.org/rainforest-primer/2-biodiversity/g-recent-losses-in-biodiversity/5-causes-of-recent-declines-in-biodiversity)//VP

The major causes of biodiversity decline are land use changes, pollution, changes in atmospheric CO2 concentrations, changes in the nitrogen cycle and acid rain, climate alterations, and the introduction of exotic species, all coincident to human population growth. For rainforests, the primary factor is land conversion. Climate will probably change least in tropical regions, and nitrogen problems are not as important because growth in rainforests is usually limited more by low phosphorus levels than by nitrogen insufficiency. The introduction of exotic species is also less of a problem than in temperate areas because there is so much diversity in tropical forests that newcomers have difficulty becoming established (Sala, et al., 2000). a. **Human population growth**: The geometric rise in human population levels during the twentieth century is the fundamental cause of the loss of biodiversity. It exacerbates every other factor having an impact on rainforests (not to mention other ecosystems). It has led to an unceasing search for more arable land for food production and livestock grazing, and for wood for fuel, construction, and energy. Previously undisturbed areas (which may or may not be suitable for the purposes to which they are constrained) are being transformed into agricultural or pasture land, stripped of wood, or mined for resources to support the energy needs of an ever-growing human population. Humans also tend to settle in areas of high biodiversity, which often have relatively rich soils and other attractions for human activities. This leads to great threats to biodiversity, especially since many of these areas have numerous endemic species. Balmford, et al., (2001) have demonstrated that human population size in a given tropical area correlates with the number of endangered species, and that this pattern holds for every taxonomic group. Most of the other effects mentioned below are either consequent to the human population expansion or related to it. The human population was approximately 600,000 million in 1700, and one billion in 1800. Just now it exceeds six billion, and low estimates are that it may reach 10 billion by the mid-21st century and 12 billion by 2100. The question is whether many ecological aspects of biological systems can be sustained under the pressure of such numbers. Can birds continue to migrate, can larger organisms have space (habitat) to forage, can ecosystems survive in anything like their present form, or are they doomed to impoverishment and degradation? b. **Habitat destruction**: Habitat destruction is the single most important cause of the loss of rainforest biodiversity and is directly related to human population growth. As rainforest land is converted to ranches, agricultural land (and then, frequently, to degraded woodlands, scrubland, or desert), urban areas (cf. Brasilia) and other human usages, habitat is lost for forest organisms. Many species are widely distributed and thus, initially, habitat destruction may only reduce local population numbers. Species which are local, endemic, or which have specialized habitats are much more vulnerable to extinction, since once their particular habitat is degraded or converted for human activity, they will disappear. Most of the habitats being destroyed are those which contain the highest levels of biodiversity, such as lowland tropical wet forests. In this case, habitat loss is caused by clearing, selective logging, and burning. c. **Pollution**: Industrial, agricultural and waste-based pollutants can have catastrophic effects on many species. Those species which are more tolerant of pollution will survive; those requiring pristine environments (water, air, food) will not. Thus, pollution can act as a selective agent. Pollution of water in lakes and rivers has degraded waters so that many freshwater ecosystems are dying. Since almost 12% of animals species live in these ecosystems, and most others depend on them to some degree, this is a very serious matter. In developing countries approximately 90% of wastewater is discharged, untreated, directly into waterways. d. **Agriculture**: The dramatic increase in the number of humans during the twentieth century has instigated a concomitant growth in agriculture, and has led to conversion of wildlands to croplands, massive diversions of water from lakes, rivers and underground aquifers, and, at the same time, has polluted water and land resources with pesticides, fertilizers, and animal wastes. The result has been the destruction, disturbance or disabling of terrestrial ecosystems, and polluted, oxygen-depleted and atrophied water resources. Formerly, agriculture in different regions of the world was relatively independent and local. Now, however, much of it has become part of the global exchange economy and has caused significant changes in social organization. Earlier agricultural systems were integrated with and co-evolved with technologies, beliefs, myths and traditions as part of an integrated social system. Generally, people planted a variety of crops in different areas, in the hope of obtaining a reasonably stable food supply. These systems could only be maintained at low population levels, and were relatively nondestructive (but not always). More recently, agriculture has in many places lost its local character, and has become incorporated into the global economy. This has led to increased pressure on agricultural land for exchange commodities and export goods. More land is being diverted from local food production to “cash crops” for export and exchange; fewer types of crops are raised, and each crop is raised in much greater quantities than before. Thus, ever more land is converted from forest (and other natural systems) for agriculture for export, rather than using land for subsistence crops. The introduction of monocropping and the use of relatively few plants for food and other uses – at the expense of the wide variety of plants and animals utilized by earlier peoples and indigenous peoples – is responsible for a loss of diversity and genetic variability. The native plants and animals adapted to the local conditions are now being replaced with “foreign” (or “exotic”) species which require special inputs of food and nutrients, large quantities of water. Such exotic species frequently drive out native species. There is pressure to conform to crop selection and agricultural techniques – all is driven by global markets and technologies. e. Global warming: There is recent evidence that climate changes are having effects on tropical forest ecology. Warming in general (as distinct from the effects of increasing concentrations of CO2 and other greenhouse gases) can increase primary productivity, yielding new plant biomass, increased organic litter, and increased food supplies for animals and soil flora (decomposers). Temperature changes can also alter the water cycle and the availability of nitrogen and other nutrients. Basically, the temperature variations which are now occurring affect all parts of forest ecosystems, some more than others. These interactions are unimaginably complex. While warming may at first increase net primary productivity (NPP), in the longer run, because plant biomass is increasing, more nitrogen is taken up from the soil and sequestered in the plant bodies. This leaves less nitrogen for the growth of additional plants, so the increase in NPP over time (due to a rise in temperature or CO2 levels) will be limited by nitrogen availability. The same is probably true of other mineral nutrients. The consequences of warming-induced shifts in the distribution of nutrients will not be seen rapidly, but perhaps only over many years. These events may effect changes in species distribution and other ecosystem processes in complex ways. We know little about the reactions of tropical forests, but they may differ from those of temperate forests. In tropical forests, warming may be more important because of its effects on evapotranspiration and soil moisture levels than because of nutrient redistribution or NPP (which is already very high because tropical temperatures are close to the optimum range for photosynthesis and there is so much available light energy). And warming will obviously act in concert with other global or local changes – increases in atmospheric CO2 (which may modify plant chemistry and the water balance of the forest) and land clearing (which changes rainfall and local temperatures), for examples. (For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Shaver, et al., 2000.) Root, et al.(2003) have determined that more than 80%of plant and animal species on which they gathered data had undergone temperature-related shifts in physiology. Highland forests in Costa Rica have suffered losses of amphibian and reptile populations which appear to be due to increased warming of montane forests. The golden toad Bufo periglenes of Costa Rica has become extinct, at least partly because of the decrease in mist frequency in its cloud forest habitat. The changes in mists appear to be a consequence of warming trends. Other suspected causes are alterations in juvenile growth or maturation rates or sex ratios due to temperature shifts. Parmesan and Yohe (2003), in a statistical analysis, determined that climate change had biological effects on the 279 species which they examined. The migratory patterns of some birds which live in both tropical and temperate regions during the year seem to be shifting, which is dangerous for these species, as they may arrive at their breeding or wintering grounds at an inappropriate time. Or they may lose their essential interactions with plants which they pollinate or their insect or plant food supplies. Perhaps for these reasons, many migratory species are in decline, and their inability to coördinate migratory clues with climatic actualities may be partly to blame. The great tit, which still breeds at the same time as previously, now misses much of its food supply because its plant food develops at an earlier time of year, before the birds have arrived from their wintering grounds. Also, as temperatures rise, some bird populations have shifted, with lowland and foothill species moving into higher areas. The consequences for highland bird populations are not yet clear. And many other organisms, both plant and animal, are being affected by warming. An increase in infectious diseases is another consequence of climate change, since the causative agents are affected by humidity, temperature change, and rainfall. Many species of frogs and lizards have declined or disappeared, perhaps because of the increase in parasites occasioned by higher temperatures. As warming continues, accelerating plant growth, pathogens may spread more quickly because of the increased availability of vegetation (a “density” effect) and because of increased humidity under heavier plant cover. As mentioned above, the fungus Phytophtora cinnamoni has demolished many Eucalyptus forests in Australia. In addition, the geographical range of pathogens can expand when the climate moderates, allowing pathogens to find new, nonresistant hosts. On the other hand, a number of instances of amphibian decline seem to be due to infections with chrytid fungi, which flourish at cooler temperatures. An excellent review of this complex issue may be found in Harvell, et al., (2002). There may be a link between augmented carbon dioxide levels and marked increase in the density of lianas in Amazonian forests. This relationship is suggested by the fact that growth rates of lianas are highly sensitive to CO2 levels. As lianas become more dense, tree mortality rises, but mortality is not equal among species because lianas preferentially grow on certain species. Because of this biodiversity may be reduced by increased mortality in some species but not others (Phillips, et al., 2002). f. **Forest fragmentation**: The fragmentation of forests is a general consequence of the haphazard logging and agricultural land conversion which is occurring everywhere, but especially in tropical forests. When forests are cut into smaller and smaller pieces, there are many consequences, some of which may be unanticipated. i) Fragmentation decreases habitat simply through loss of land area, reducing the probability of maintaining effective reproductive units of plant and animal populations. Most tropical trees are pollinated by animals, and therefore the maintenance of adequate pollinator population levels is essential for forest health. When a forest becomes fragmented, trees of many species are isolated because their pollinators cannot cross the unforested areas. Under these conditions, the trees in the fragments will then become inbred and lose genetic variability and vigor. Other species, which have more wide-ranging pollinators, may suffer less from fragmentation. For instance, the pollen of several species of strangler figs (the fruit of which is an essential element in the diets of many animals) is dispersed by wasps over distances as great as 14.2 km (Nason, Herre, & Hamrick, 1998). Thus “breeding units” of these figs are extremely large, comprising hundreds of plants located in huge areas of forest. Isolated fig populations seem to survive and help to maintain frugivore numbers (if not diversity), so long as the number of trees within the range of the wasps does not fall below a critical minimum. Most species are not so tolerant, however. Animals, particularly large ones, cannot maintain themselves in small fragmented forests. Many large mammals have huge ranges and require extensive areas of intact forest to obtain sufficient food, or to find suitable nesting sites. Additionally, their migrations may be interrupted by fragmentation. These animals are also much more susceptible to hunting in forest fragments, which accounts for much of the decline in animal populations in rainforests. Species extinctions occur more rapidly in fragments, for these reasons, and also because species depend upon each other. The dissection of forests into fragments in certain parts of the Amazon has led to extreme hunting pressures on peccaries, for instance, and in some places where they are locally extinct, three species of frogs have also disappeared, since they depended upon peccary wallows for breeding ponds. The absence of large predator species leads to imbalances in prey populations, and, since many of the prey species are seed-eaters, to declines in the population levels of many plant species. The prey, now at high population levels, consume most available seeds, leaving few to germinate. On small islands created after dam construction on the Chagres River in Panama, even large seed predators could not survive, and after 70 years, the former mixed tropical forest has become a forest of large-seeded plants only (Terborgh, 1992b). As Terborgh states, and we should attend to this lesson, “Distortions in any link of the interaction chain will induce changes in the remaining links.” (p. 289)

#### Even if it is, it's irreversible - past the tipping point

Spaeth, 12/5/12 [“Why it's probably too late to roll back global warming”, Ryu,The Week News, http://theweek.com/article/index/237392/why-its-probably-too-late-to-roll-back-global-warming]

Two degrees Celsius. According to scientists, that's the rise in global temperature, measured against pre-industrial times, that could spark some of the most catastrophic effects of global warming. Preventing the two-degree bump has been the goal of every international treaty designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including a new one currently being hammered out at a United Nations summit in Doha, Qatar. But a new study published by the journal Nature Climate Change shows that it's incredibly unlikely that global warming can be limited to two degrees. According to the study, the world in 2011 "pumped nearly 38.2 billion tons of carbon dioxide into the air from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil," says Seth Borenstein at The Associated Press: The total amounts to more than 2.4 million pounds (1.1 million kilograms) of carbon dioxide released into the air every second. Because emissions of the key greenhouse gas have been rising steadily and most carbon stays in the air for a century, it is not just unlikely but "rather optimistic" to think that the world can limit future temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit), said the study's lead author, Glen Peters at the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, Norway. What happens when the two-degree threshold is crossed? Most notably, that's when the polar ice caps will begin to melt, leading to a dangerous rise in sea levels. Furthermore, the world's hottest regions will be unable to grow food, setting the stage for mass hunger and global food inflation. The rise in temperature would also likely exacerbate or cause extreme weather events, such as hurricanes and droughts. There is a very small chance that the world could pull back from the brink. The U.N. could still limit warming to two degrees if it adopts a "radical plan," [says Peters' group](http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2012/12/can-we-still-limit-warming-to-two-degrees). According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers study, such a plan would entail cutting carbon emissions "by 5.1 percent every year from now to 2050, essentially slamming the breaks on growth starting right now," says Coral Davenport at The National Journal, "and keeping the freeze on for 37 years." However, the U.N. has set a deadline of ratifying a new treaty by 2015, and implementing it by 2020, which means the world is already eight years behind that pace. There are still major disagreements between the U.S. and China over whether the developed world, which industrialized first, should bear the bulk of the cost of reducing carbon emissions. And there is, of course, a large contingent of Americans who don't even believe climate change exists, putting any treaty's ratification at risk. Climate change is so politically toxic in America that Congress has prioritized the fiscal cliff over — no exaggeration — untold suffering and the end of the world as we know it. In other words, it isn't happening. And if that's not bad enough, keep in mind that the two-degree mark is just the beginning, says Davenport: Michael Oppenheimer, a professor of geosciences and international affairs at Princeton University and a member of the Nobel Prize-winning U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, says that a 2-degree rise is not itself that point, but rather the beginning of irreversible changes. "It starts to speed you toward a tipping point," he said. "It's driving toward a cliff at night with the headlights off. We don't know when we'll hit that cliff, but after 2 degrees, we're going faster, we have less control. After 3, 4, 5 degrees, you spiral out of control, you have even more irreversible change." Indeed, at the current emissions rate, the world is expected to broach the four-degree mark by 2100 — at which point, we can expect even worse environmental catastrophes.

# 2nc

# China

**b. timeframe – perception of the plan slashes Chinese soft power**

\*perception link – Chinese soft power is driven by perceived ideology of success – Chinese soft power is driven by the prospect of economic growth, the perception of increasing US influence in the region crowds-out PRC investment and Chinese investment

**Ellis 11** – Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (R. Evan, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1st Quarter, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf)//VP>

It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on **perceptions** and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still **limited** compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because **perception drives soft power**, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing **ideology**. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of **economic growth** and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a **counterweight** to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

**1. Chinese economic engagement with Latin America is high now but can grow more – the plan changes that**

**Fei 13 –**(Xu, “Xi's Trip Opens New Horizon for Ties with Latin America”, CRJ English, June 7 2013, <http://english.cri.cn/6909/2013/06/07/195s769020.htm)//VP>

China and Latin America have expanded pragmatic cooperation in recent years, delivering tangible benefits to both sides. With two-way trade reaching 261.2 billion U.S. dollars in 2012, China has become the second largest trading partner of Latin America and the Caribbean, which witnessed the world's fastest growth in exports to China. By investing nearly 65 billion dollars so far in Latin America and the Caribbean, China has helped create much-needed jobs in the region. However, both sides are fully aware that there is potential to be tapped. China's development offers great opportunities for Latin America. As the world's second biggest importer, China will buy goods worth over 1 trillion dollars over the next five years and its overseas investment will exceed half a trillion dollars. As Xi has mentioned in his speech at the Mexican Senate, China is confident in maintaining steady economic expansion, which would create more business opportunities for the world including Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin America needs Chinese investment and participation in infrastructure construction. The region's products such as farm produce and energy need the Chinese market.

# Saudi

**Disad outweighs and turns the case…**

**a) magnitude – quick Saudi proliferation ensures accidents and miscalculation – that’s Edelman, impact is extinction**

**Toon 07** - (Owen B, chair – Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences – Colorado University, climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

**b) most probable impact**

**Russell 09** - James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

**at: Fettweis evidence**

Reject their last piece of Fettweis evidence **–** itwas written more than half a decade ago and doesn’t assume new de-stabilizing forces like Iran’s 2014 nuclear acquisition program which makes war more likely

**Turns case –**

**a. turns biodiversity –** nuclear shoot-outs from arms racing shoot soot into the atmosphere which creates a shield for UV radiation which destroys agriculture

**b. turns economy** – middle east war embroils the US into a war which requires massive defense spending which risks economic collapse from excessive debt and enemy countries targeting US life support systems

**c. turns Asian war** – arms racing embroils major nations including China into wars over territory

**d. turns terrorism** – arms racing makes nuclear weapons easily accessible to terrorists and makes that impact more likely and dangerous

.

**AFF evidence doesn’t assume perceived breakdown of US-Saudi ties—that causes prolif**

**Lippman ’11** - (Sr. Adjunct Scholar-Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.susris.com/2011/08/05/saudi-arabia’s-nuclear-policy-lippman/)

So let us suppose that Saudi Arabia’s currently testy relationship with the United States deteriorated to the point where the Saudis no longer *felt* they could rely on Washington’s protection. If the Saudis could no longer assume that the armed forces of the United States are their ultimate weapon against external threats, might they not wish to acquire a different ultimate weapon? With that in mind, could not a reasonable case be made in the Saudis’ minds for the development of an alternative security relationship, and perhaps a nuclear agreement, with another major power should relations with the United States deteriorate? A possible candidate for such a role would of course be China, a nuclear power that has a close relationship with Saudi Arabia’s ally Pakistan and a growing need for imported oil. Sufficiently remote from the Gulf not to pose a direct threat to Saudi Arabia, and no longer part of any international communist movement, China could theoretically be an attractive partner. This is not to say that Saudi Arabia is actually seeking such a relationship with any country other the United States, or that China would undertake such a mission, but to be unaware of any such outreach is not to exclude it from the realm of possibility. THE STRATEGY GAP The Saudi Arabian armed forces have never developed a coherent national security doctrine that could provide a serious basis for a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. But to summarize the reasons why Saudi Arabia might pursue such a course: it is a rich but weak country with armed forces of suspect competence; outmanned by combat-hardened, truculent and potentially nuclear-armed neighbors; and no longer confident that it can count on its American protector. Even before the Iraq War, Richard L. Russell of the National Defense University argued in a 2001 essay arguing the case for Saudi acquisition of nuclear capability that “It would be imprudent, to say the least, for Riyadh to make the cornerstone of [its] national-security posture out of an assumption that the United States would come to the kingdom’s defense under any and all circumstances.” It might be even more imprudent now. “From Riyadh’s perspective,” continued Russell, “the acquisition of nuclear weapons and secure delivery systems would appear logical and even necessary.” Those “secure delivery systems,” Russell argued, would not be aircraft, which are vulnerable to ground defenses, but “ballistic-missile delivery systems that would stand a near-invulnerable chance of penetrating enemy airspace” — namely, the CSS-2s. Military experts say it is theoretically possible that the missiles could be made operational, modernized, and retrofitted with nuclear warheads acquired from China, Pakistan or perhaps, within a few years, North Korea. Any attempt to do so, however, would present immense technical and political difficulties — so much so that Saudi Arabia might emerge less secure, rather than more.

**Lack of oil relations causes rapid prolif**

**Black 09** -(Major Chris, master’s program at the Joint Forces Staff College, “Post Oil America and a renewable energy policy leads to the abrogation of the Middle East to China.,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA530125&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

All of these factors have slowly led to Saudi Arabia wanting to assume a more independent role in its own security.181 In 2007, Saudi Arabia brokered a deal between Fatah and Hamas and hosted an Arab League Summit which they had declined to attend the two previous years. Also in 2007, King Abdullah also hosted Iran’s President Ahmadinejad and canceled a state dinner with President Bush.182 Recently Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faial warned Iran on two separate occasions to stop meddling in inter-Arab affairs and has urged Arabs to unify clearly concerned with Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.183 Additionally, this has brought about a renewed emphasis by the Saudis to acquire from Pakistan both Chinese-designed missiles and dual-key Pakistani nuclear warheads which is a major concern by the US.184 Saudi Arabia is now flexing their muscle in the Middle East and has taken an increasing role in managing their own affairs. This scenario could lead to either cooperation or competition between the US and China in the region. Further, in this scenario, **Saudi Arabia will increasingly align with the countries who are buying their oil**. A geopolitical shift will begin with the rise of China in the Persian Gulf region secondary to a diminishing American presence, **which will intensify Saudi Arabian concerns for their security.**

**New oil markets makes Saudis perceive decline in US-Saudi ties.**

**House ’12** - (not oft-disgruntled House, M.D., but Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, Karen Elliott House. Carnegie Council Transcripts and Articles – November 30, 2012 – lexis)

QUESTION: Warren Hoge[28], International Peace Institute. Karen, there's a lot of talk in American politics about the desire to become energy independent, no longer dependent upon countries like Saudi Arabia, and there's a real possibility that could happen. The numbers are there, fracking and offshore oil, that sort of thing. Suppose that does happen. How would that **affect our relationship with Saudi Arabia**, **and is this something the Saudis themselves worry about?** KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE: **I don't think they like it when we talk about energy independence**. **They** do **take that as a personal insult**. I think it would loosen somewhat our sense of dependence. But the global economy is still going to be not we so much; I mean we're not a major importer of Saudi oil now but the global economy is a major importer of Saudi oil and will continue to be. There are a lot of people, like John Deutch[29], who is a very smart man and certainly knows energy, who believes that it doesn't matter who runs Saudi Arabia, they will export oil. And they obviously will export some. But if you assume that if anything happened to take the royal family out of the picture, the only other organized structure because nothing is allowed to organize, no book clubs, no photography clubs, no soccer leagues other than the one the government runs is the religious organization. There are 70,000 mosques all over the country. That's basically one for every 150 men. So that's the most organized group.

**Oil independence deteriorates US-Saudi ties**

**Tanter ’12** - [RAYMOND TANTER, Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan; President of Iran Policy Committee Publishing; and former member of the National Security Council staff in the Reagan-Bush Administration, “The Geopolitics of U.S. Energy Independence,” International Economy, Summer 2012, http://www.international-economy.com/TIE\_Su12\_GeopoliticsEnergySymp.pdf]

At issue is whether energy independence will cause a revision of U.S. national security policy. Because energy is only one of the drivers, energy independence is unlikely to have the major effect implied by the Verleger thesis. During the Cold War, American participation in the Korean and Vietnam Wars did not have energy as a driver; likewise, energy is not at the core of U.S. long-term commitments to South Korea and Japan in the post-Cold War era. Shared values, prior commitments, and strategic calculations are more important than energy regarding countries such as Israel. In my experience on the National Security Council staff in the 1980s, there was little discussion of energy in relation to Israel. Ditto for Turkey. Control of energy was more important than values and commitments for Washington to save Kuwait after Iraq’s invasion in the first Gulf War, but not relevant to the takedown of Saddam Hussein a decade later, and irrelevant to the post-September 11 invasion of Afghanistan to defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban. With respect to Iran, energy was a factor in the cooperation of American and British intelligence to overthrow the Mosaddeq government in 1953, but proliferation concerns trump energy a half century later. Concerning Saudi Arabia, energy is at the heart of the relationship. So rising oil prices and production costs, declining reserves, and increasingly available alternative fuels as well as **nonconventional sources of oil are bound to make Riyadh of less consequence to Washington than it is today.** Saudi Arabia’s comparative advantage in oil production and the world economy’s thirst for oil converged to make the Kingdom a strategic ally in the past. But the odds that the Kingdom will survive the spreading Arab revolts are not high, and the American commitment to the royal family is mainly against external, not internal, threats. Hence, coming to the defense of the Kingdom is likely to be perceived in Washington as too costly when the threat is from within. With European countries becoming more dependent on Russia for energy supplies, and Russia as well as Germany becoming closer economic partners, the likelihood of out-of-area involvement by NATO in such places as Afghanistan is not high. And as the saying goes, “Out of area or out of business!” Verleger suggests that American energy independence could make this era the “New American Century” by creating an economic environment where the United States enjoys access to energy supplies at much lower cost than other parts of the world and giving the U.S. economy an edge over other nations, particularly northern Europe. In the context of enhanced American energy independence, the Obama Administration’s pivot to Asia is likely to be of more import for Europe than the Middle East. Finally, U.S. energy independence is likely to reinforce isolationist foreign policy tendencies already in force in the United States. A gamechanging event like an Iranian nuclear weapon could wipe out the tide toward isolationism.

**US-Saudi interaction is fully dependent on oil – the plan removes that link**

**Congregalli ’13** - [Matteo Congregalli, International Politics Journalist, “Without Oil. Without Allies: USA and the New American Dream of Independent Energy,” Urban Times, 2/15/13, <http://urbantimes.co/magazine/2013/02/usa-oil-saudi-arabia-independent-domestic-energy-supply/>]

Examples of oil-diplomacy are known to be neither smooth nor easy. Take, for example, the harsh relations between the US and Colonel Gaddafi’s Libya; or the invasion of Iraq, back in 2003, whose justification was not uniquely about Saddam’s Weapons of Mass Destruction – as UN reports confirmed; or the closure of the Hormuz strait, back in 2011. Iran threatened to close the strait in retaliation to the massive burden of sanctions on the Islamic Republic. As an unlucky coincidence, almost 17 billion barrels pass through the strait, every day. The blockade imposed by the Iranian military Navy made the oil prices skyrocket in just few weeks. Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the US was always based on mutual convenience. After 9/11, both Washington and Riyadh were allies in War on Terror. US wanted stability in the area. Later on, Saudi Arabia wanted to preserve their power in spite of the Arab Spring. US needed oil for a convenient price. Saudi Arabia needed arms. In 2008, the US Senate struggled to approve a resolution to help cut soaring gasoline prices by providing the Saudi government with 900 cutting-edge military kits in return for increasing oil production. The resolution aimed at securing the Gulf area and winning support for the growing sanctions on Iran. Despite the potential revenue – about $20 billion – the decision was stalling at the Senate as the Saudis were not keen on downing the price of the crude oil from 75 cents to 50 cents per gallon. “We are saying to the Saudis that, if you don’t help us, why should we be helping you? ” said the democratic Senator Chuck Schumer. “We are saying that we need real relief, and we need it quickly. You need our arms, but we need you to cooperate and not strangle American consumers.” The resolution passed, eventually. According to statistics: throughout Bush’s terms, the arms dealing with Saudi doubled from $19 billion between 2001-2004 to $40 billion between 2005- 2008. In the last five years, under Obama’s administration, the deals reached $60 billion. At the end of December 2011, the US Department of State held a press briefing about a further arms sale to Saudi Arabia. The agreement included 84 brand new F-15 combat aircrafts for an eight-figure sum: $30 billion. The Assistant secretary Andrew Shapiro declared: “This agreement serves to reinforce the strong and enduring relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.” No matter how much discounted oil you can get. Providing cutting-edge arms is also a strategy to ensure the stability of the region, crucial for American interests. “There are geopolitical interests at stake, driving the arms deal. Saudi Arabia works with the US as they have a common strategy and common agreement,” says Farhang Moradi, senior lecturer in Globalisation and Development at University of Westminster, London. Shipping F-15s to Riyadh is a first-line defence to empower the biggest US ally in the region. But “We have to keep in mind that buying arms in respect of selling oil could be the case. However, buying advanced arms doesn’t put the Saudi in the position of defining the area from actors such as Iran.” Security, first – The positions of the American military bases in the Persian Gulf (Image Source: Google Maps). An additional security belt of air and ground bases extends all around Iran and the Persian Gulf. There are at least 21 bases in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Bahrain and Kuwait. The question we should answer is whether the military infrastructures are about to be left behind now that the burden of regional interests and energy need is shrinking. “These bases are giving them the infrastructures to check and balance. It costs them something but the cost is worth it in order to manage the gulf,” says Moradi. The military presence is a result of with oil production and the control of the political actors. The Gulf oil has always been a priority for the US. But in the age of the war on terror and the growing threat of a nuclear Iran, abandoning the battlefield is not a strategy-wise option. In the same regard, we should not expect the sanctions against Iran to diminish and that the US army will leave their bases anytime soon. The real shift in the region could come in the long run. “If US oil demands fall, it doesn’t mean that foreign demand won’t continue. Emerging countries suck oik; China, India, Turkey. They need oil on their routes to development” says Moradi. According to many, in ten years time there will be a new producer-consumer relationship in the region. It will not involve the US anymore. Russia, China, India will be bounded by new energy ties. “The demand for oil is going to be pretty good. Those producing oil are therefore going to export a lot. The balance of forces will change in terms of energy and power. Those changes will have subsequent effects upon other countries that may perceive themselves as competing powers against USA; China and Russia.” This likely shift of interest will cause a scenario where China and India will discontinue being mere investors in the Middle East and Central Asia. In the near future they could install bases and military infrastructures in the region, while the American ones will be gone. The de-Americanisation of the Gulf is yet to come. But the first signs are already emerging. At the beginning of February, the US secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta announced that just one aircraft carrier will be deployed in the Gulf instead of two. The decision is motivated by defence budget cuts. Is it a sign of the de-prioritisation of the control of the Gulf? Probably. In the meantime, the lowering security in the area, as well the US’ soft way of dealing with the Arab Spring, is making the Gulf States nervous. Are diplomatic relations facing a crisis? It is definitely a sign of an upcoming change. The surge in US oil and natural gas production, which will scatter the American diplomatic ties, is not without reason. America suddenly found out that underneath their land, millions of barrels of sweet crude oil were reachable by merely changing the drilling technique. A well-known one is called ‘fracking’ which involves fracturing layers of rock and pumping water and sand in the well to get to the oil reserve. Tens of sites in the US were considered worthless till fracking was introduced. Fracturing the rocks allow to reach deep and huge oil reserves, otherwise out-of-the-way. That’s how the States are turning into a Saudi Arabia with burgers, baseball, and guns.